One-round Secure Key Exchange Protocol With Strong Forward Secrecy

• Xiaowei Li,
• Dengqi Yang,
• Benhui Chen,
• Yuqing Zhang,

Vol. 10, No. 11, November 29, 2016
10.3837/tiis.2016.11.024, Download Paper (Free):

• one round
• Key Exchange
• Forward Secrecy
• ephemeral key reveal

Abstract

Security models for key exchange protocols have been researched for years, however, lots of them only focus on what secret can be compromised but they do not differentiate the timing of secrets compromise, such as the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we propose a new security model for key exchange protocols which can not only consider what keys can be compromised as well as when they are compromised. The proposed security model is important to the security proof of the key exchange protocols with forward secrecy (either weak forward secrecy (wFS) or strong forward secrecy (sFS)). In addition, a new kind of key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks which is called strong key compromise impersonation (sKCI) attack is proposed. Finally, we provide a new one-round key exchange protocol called mOT+ based on mOT protocol. The security of the mOT+ is given in the new model. It can provide the properties of sKCI-resilience and sFS and it is secure even if the ephemeral key reveal query is considered.

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