

# Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption supporting unbounded attribute space from R-LWE

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## Abstract

Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a useful cryptographic technology for guaranteeing data confidentiality but also fine-grained access control. Typically, CP-ABE can be divided into two classes: small universe with polynomial attribute space and large universe with unbounded attribute space. Since the learning with errors over rings (R-LWE) assumption has characteristics of simple algebraic structure and simple calculations, based on R-LWE, we propose a small universe CP-ABE scheme to improve the efficiency of the scheme proposed by Zhang *et al.* (AsiaCCS 2012). On this basis, to achieve unbounded attribute space and improve the expression of attribute, we propose a large universe CP-ABE scheme with the help of a full-rank differences function. In this scheme, all polynomials in the R-LWE can be used as values of an attribute, and these values do not need to be enumerated at the setup phase. Different trapdoors are used to generate secret keys in the key generation and the security proof. Both proposed schemes are selectively secure in the standard model under R-LWE. Comparison with other schemes demonstrates that our schemes are simpler and more efficient. R-LWE can obtain greater efficiency, and unbounded attribute space means more flexibility, so our research is suitable in practices.

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**Keywords:** Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption, R-LWE, unbounded, small universe, large universe

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## 1. Introduction

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has attracted much attention because it can achieve flexible one-to-many encryption, provide the ability to encrypt the data without knowing the specific information of receivers and realize fine-grained access control to encrypted data [1, 2]. In 2007, Bethencourt *et al.* [3] introduced a variant of ABE called ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE), which enables data owners to freely define access structures over attribute sets and encrypt the data under the structures. Since then, CP-ABE is widely used in many scenarios, such as access control for data stored on the cloud [4, 5] and secure online social networks [6, 7] and so on.

Over the past few years, many ABE/CP-ABE schemes have been proposed to achieve various functional purposes. Cheung and Newport [8] proposed a CP-ABE scheme in which access structures are AND-gates, and the scheme is proved to be secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Hur [9] presented a CP-ABE scheme to achieve immediate user revocation. An access control (CP-ABE) scheme is proposed by Zhang *et al.* [10] to realize both user revocability and attribute update, and the scheme is secure to the DBDH assumption. Liu *et al.* [11] presented a hierarchical ABE scheme from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Zhu *et al.* [12] constructed an ABE scheme from the learning with errors over rings (R-LWE) assumption. Fun and Samsudin [13] presented a CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE, which applied the linear secret sharing scheme to express an access structure.

However, once public parameters have been set in the setup phase, they are bounded in the whole encryption system for the above schemes. Especially, a data owner cannot set flexible and arbitrary access structures. Lewko *et al.* [14] solved this problem by introducing fresh local randomness at the phases of key generation and encryption, and divided ABE schemes into two classes: small universe and large universe. In a small universe ABE scheme, the size of the attribute space is polynomially bounded in the security parameter, and the size of the public parameters grows linearly with the number of attributes, such as [3, 8-11]. In a large universe ABE scheme, the attribute universe is exponentially large, and the public parameters do not impose additional restrictions on the functionality of the scheme, thus “unbounded” is achieved. Okamoto and Takashima [15] proposed first fully secure unbounded ABE scheme, and proved that the scheme is secure under the decisional linear assumption in the standard model. Rouselakis and Waters [16] described how to construct an unbounded CP-ABE scheme over prime order groups. Li *et al.* [17] constructed an unbounded multi-authority CP-ABE scheme with no needless restriction on the public parameters. Agrawal *et al.* [18] combined a small universe ABE scheme with a compatible standard model identity-based encryption scheme to construct a large universe ABE scheme from LWE. Zhang *et al.* [19] proposed a large universe CP-ABE scheme from LWE, and proved that the scheme is selectively secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA).

The above ABE schemes from LWE have the characteristic of simple algebraic structure, but these schemes are not efficient enough in practices because of an intrinsic quadratic computation overhead when using LWE. Thereby, Lyubashevsky *et al.* [20] introduced the LWE assumption over rings (R-LWE) whose distribution is pseudorandom. They also proved that the security of the R-LWE assumption can be reduced to the hardness of SVP in the worst case on ideal lattices. Cryptographic schemes based on R-LWE have many advantages, such as fast implementation and small public key size, ciphertext size and secret key size. As far as

we know, there are two papers on ABE schemes based on R-LWE: one is proposed by Zhu *et al.* [12] and the other is proposed by Fun and Samsudin [13]. However, the scheme proposed by Zhu *et al.* [12] does not satisfy CPA security. Here is the reason: assume  $C = PK \cdot r + pe + M$  is the ciphertext which contains the plaintext  $M$ , where  $PK$  and  $p$  are public. The adversary randomly chooses two equal length messages  $M_0$  and  $M_1$ , and sends them to the challenger. The challenger picks  $\mathcal{B} \in \{0,1\}$  randomly and encrypts the message  $M_{\mathcal{B}}$  to construct a challenge ciphertext  $C^*$ , then sends  $C^*$  to the adversary. The adversary obtains  $C^*$  and computes  $(C^* \bmod p) \bmod (PK \bmod p)$ , then he can distinguish which message is encrypted. This explains that the scheme in [12] is not correct. Similar attack also exists in the CP-ABE scheme proposed by Fun and Samsudin [13].

### 1.1 Our contribution

Because the R-LWE assumption can use the fast Fourier transform (FFT) to compute the product of polynomials in the rings, encryption schemes based on R-LWE are more efficient than those based on LWE in the similar framework. In this paper, we first propose a small universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE for threshold access structure. We apply a Gaussian sampling algorithm over rings to generate a secret key whose size is reduced by nearly half compare with the first scheme in [19]. In the decryption phase, the Lagrange interpolation coefficients are used to reconstruct the secret embedded in the ciphertext. Making convenience of computation, we need to clear the denominators of the Lagrange interpolation coefficients. In order to do this, we take a sufficiently large constant which is associated with the number of system attributes multiplies the results derived from the sampling algorithm.

Then, we extend the proposed scheme to a large universe scheme supporting unbounded attribute space with the help of a full-rank differences (FRD) function, which means that the public parameters do not impose additional restriction on the values of attributes used for key generation and encryption. Two lattices called left lattice and right lattice are used in the key generation of the proposed scheme and its security proof, respectively. We apply the FRD function to map the coefficient vector of each attribute value to matrix, then combine a trapdoor of the left lattice to generate a secret key for a user in the large universe scheme such that the distribution of the secret key is statistically close to the discrete Gaussian distribution, and in the security proof, a trapdoor of the right lattice is used to generate a secret key for the adversary. In the encryption phase, we apply a low norm randomization matrix to ensure that attacks cannot distinguish between pseudorandom and true randomness. Both schemes are secure against CPA in the selective model. Moreover, compared with the schemes in [19], our small universe scheme has shorter public key, secret key and ciphertext sizes, and needs fewer operations for encryption per bit; our large universe scheme also has shorter public key size and needs fewer operations for encryption per bit, while the secret key and ciphertext sizes are equal to those in [19].

### 1.2. Organization

This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose a small universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE and analyze its security. In Section 4, we propose a large universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE and also analyze its security. We compare our schemes with the existing CP-ABE schemes based on the LWE assumption in Section 5. Finally, we summarize the results of the paper in Section 6.

## 2. Preliminaries

### 2.1. Notations

Let bold lowercase and capital letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. Let  $Z$  and  $\tilde{R}$  represent sets of integers and real numbers, and  $n$  be a power of 2. Let  $poly(n)$  represent an indeterminate function  $g(n) = O(n^c)$  for a certain constant  $c$ . Let  $q \equiv 1 \pmod{2n}$  represent a sufficiently large public prime modulus,  $Z_q$  denote a set of integers modulo  $q$ ,  $Z[x]$  be a set of polynomials with integer coefficients. We take  $f(x) = x^n + 1 \in Z[x]$ , which is irreducible over the rational field. Let  $R = Z[x]/\langle f(x) \rangle$  be ring of integer polynomials modulo  $f(x)$ . Let  $R_q = Z_q[x]/\langle f(x) \rangle$  be ring of integer polynomials modulo both  $f(x)$  and  $q$ . Let  $R_q^\times$  be a set of invertible polynomials in  $R_q$ . Unless stated otherwise, we let  $\bar{\gamma}_\alpha \subset R_q$  represent the error distribution, which is defined in [21].

For two matrices  $X \in \tilde{R}^{m_1 \times n}$  and  $Y \in \tilde{R}^{m_2 \times n}$ ,  $(X; Y) \in \tilde{R}^{(m_1+m_2) \times n}$  is the concatenation of the rows of  $X$  and  $Y$ . Let  $a = a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1} \in R_q$  and  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)^T \in R_q^m$ . Define  $rot_f(a) = (a, ax \pmod f, \dots, ax^{n-1} \pmod f)^T \in R_q^n$  and  $Rot_f(\mathbf{x}) = (rot_f(x_1); rot_f(x_2); \dots; rot_f(x_m)) \in R_q^{mn}$ . Let  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1}) \in Z_q^n$  represent the coefficient vector of  $a$ , and let  $\|\cdot\|$  and  $\|\cdot\|_\infty$  denote the Euclidean norm and infinity norm, respectively. Then  $\|a\|$  and  $\|a\|_\infty$  can be denoted as  $\sqrt{a_0^2 + a_1^2 + \dots + a_{n-1}^2}$  and  $\max_{0 \leq i \leq n-1} (|a_i|)$ , respectively.

$\mathbf{e} = Map(\mathbf{x}) \in Z^m$  is a column vector generated by concatenating coefficients of  $x_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq m$ ) in sequence, and  $\mathbf{x} = Map^{-1}(\mathbf{e}) \in R^m$  is the inverse process of  $Map$ .  $(\{-1, +1\})^{m \times m}$  is a matrix with  $m$  rows and  $m$  columns, of which the elements whose coefficients are  $-1$  or  $1$  are chosen from  $R_q$ .  $\mathbf{X} = Trans_{V \rightarrow M}(\mathbf{x}) \in Z_q^{m \times n}$  is a  $m \times n$  matrix whose rows are comprised of coefficient vectors of  $x_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq m$ ), and  $\mathbf{x} = Trans_{M \rightarrow V}(\mathbf{X}) \in R_q^m$  is a  $m$ -dimensional vector by viewing elements of each row in  $\mathbf{X}$  as coefficients of a polynomial in  $R_q$ .

$a \leftarrow R_q$  is used to represent that  $a$  is uniformly selected in  $R_q$  at random. When we say  $x \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha$ , we mean that  $x$  is a ‘small’ random error term chosen from  $\bar{\gamma}_\alpha$  uniformly.

### 2.2. Lattices

**Definition 1.** There are  $n$  linear independent vectors  $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n \in \tilde{R}^n$ , let  $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n]$ , the lattice  $\Lambda$  generated by  $\mathbf{A}$  has the following form:

$$\Lambda = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{A}) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \mathbf{a}_i \mid x_i \in Z, 1 \leq i \leq n \right\}$$

where  $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \dots, \mathbf{a}_n$  is a basis of  $\mathcal{L}$ , and its rank is  $n$ .

**Definition 2.** For  $q$  prime,  $\mathbf{A} \in Z_q^{n \times m}$  and  $u \in Z_q^n$ , define:

$$\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A}) = \{e \in Z^m \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{A}e = 0 \pmod q\}$$

$$\Lambda_q^u(\mathbf{A}) = \{e \in Z^m \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{A}e = u \pmod q\}$$

### 2.3. Discrete Gaussians

**Definition 3.** Let  $\rho_s(x)$  denote the standard  $n$ -dimensional Gaussian distribution with center 0 and variance  $s$ , such as  $\rho_s(x) = \exp(-\pi \frac{\|x\|^2}{s^2})$ . For a given lattice  $\Lambda$  and  $s > 0$ , the sum  $\rho_s(\Lambda) = \sum_{x \in \Lambda} \rho_s(x)$  is finite, then define the lattice Gaussian distribution  $D_{\Lambda, s}$  as

$$\exists y \in \Lambda, D_{\Lambda, s}(y) = \frac{\rho_s(y)}{\rho_s(\Lambda)}$$

**Lemma 1.** ([18]) For any lattice  $\Lambda$  of integer dimension  $m$  and any two reals  $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$  and  $\sigma \geq \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ , we have

$$\Pr\{x \sim D_{\Lambda, \sigma} : \|x\| > \sqrt{m}\sigma\} \leq \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon} 2^{-m}$$

### 2.4. The R-LWE hardness assumption

**Definition 4.** For a uniformly random element  $s \in R_q$  (secret) and an error distribution  $\bar{\gamma}_\alpha$  over  $R_q$ , a sample from the R-LWE distribution  $A_{s, \bar{\gamma}_\alpha}$  is generated by selecting  $b \leftarrow R_q$  and an error term  $x' \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha$ , and outputting  $(b, bs + x') \in R_q \times R_q$ .

**Definition 5.** ([22]) The Decisional R-LWE assumption is defined as follows: consider a prime  $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$  and an error distribution  $\bar{\gamma}_\alpha$  over  $R_q$ , a decisional R-LWE assumption instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle  $O$  which is either a truly random sampling oracle  $O_\$$  or a pseudo-random sampling oracle  $O_s$ , where  $O_\$$  outputs truly uniform random samples from  $R_q \times R_q$ , and  $O_s$  outputs samples  $(b_i, b_i s + x_i)$  according to the R-LWE distribution. We say that an adversary  $A$  can solve the decisional R-LWE assumption if  $A$ 's advantage  $Adv(A) = |\Pr[A^{O_\$} = 1] - \Pr[A^{O_s} = 1]|$  is non-negligible for a random  $s \in R_q$ .

Assuming that the worst case  $\gamma$ -Ideal-SVP cannot be efficiently solved by using quantum algorithms for small  $\gamma$ , Steinfeld [21] showed that the R-LWE problem is hard (see Theorem 1).

**Theorem 1.** Assume that  $\alpha q = \omega(n\sqrt{\log n})$  and  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  and  $q = poly(n)$ . There is a randomized polynomial time quantum reduction from  $\gamma$ -Ideal-SVP to R-LWE $_{q, \alpha}$ , with  $\gamma = \omega(n^{1.5} \log n) / \alpha$ .

**Lemma 2.** ([21]) Assume that  $\alpha q \geq \sqrt{n}$ . For any  $r \in R$ , we have

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha} [\|yr\|_\infty \geq \alpha q \omega(\log n) \cdot \|r\|] \leq n^{-\omega(1)}$$

### 2.5. Important algorithms

#### 2.5.1. Preimage sampling algorithm

**RingSamplePre** ( $Rot_f^\top(a), T_a, u, \sigma$ ). Let  $q$  be a prime and  $a$  be a  $m$ -dimensional vector in  $R_q^m$ . On input a row vector  $Rot_f^\top(a)$  with short trapdoor basis  $T_a$ , a target image  $u \in R_q$  and a Gaussian parameter  $\sigma$ , output  $e \in Z^{mm}$  which sampled from a distribution statistically close to  $D_{Z^{mm}, \sigma}$ .

#### 2.5.2. Trapdoor generation algorithm

The following theorem is used by Yang *et al.* [22] to generate the trapdoor over ideal

lattices, we call the theorem as the trapdoor generation algorithm over rings, short for **RingGenTrap**.

**Theorem 2.** ([22]) There is a PPT algorithm with the following properties. It takes as inputs  $n$ ,  $r > 0$ ,  $q$ ,  $m_1 \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $m_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ , a degree  $n$  polynomial  $f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  and random vector  $\mathbf{g}_1 \in (\mathbb{R}_q^\times)^{m_1}$ . It also takes as inputs  $\mathbf{u}_i \in \mathbb{R}^{m_1}$  ( $0 \leq i \leq m_2$ ) whose coefficients are selected from  $D_{\mathbb{Z}^{m_1 \times n}, \sigma}$ . Let  $f = \prod_{i \leq t} f_i$  be its factorization over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $\kappa = \lceil 1 + \log q \rceil$ ,  $\Delta = (\prod_{i \leq t} (1 + (q/3^r)^{\deg(f_i)} - 1))^{1/2}$  and  $m = m_1 + m_2$ . Compute  $\mathbf{g}_2 = (\mathbf{u}_1^\top \mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{u}_2^\top \mathbf{g}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_{m_2}^\top \mathbf{g}_1)$ . The algorithm succeeds with probability  $\geq 1 - p$ , where  $p = (1 - \prod_{i \leq t} (1 - q^{-\deg(f_i)}))^\sigma$ , when it does, it outputs  $\mathbf{g} = (\mathbf{g}_1; \mathbf{g}_2) \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$  and a (trapdoor) basis  $S \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$  of the lattice  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{g}))$ , such that:

1. The distance to uniformity of  $\mathbf{g}$  is at most  $p + m_2 \Delta$ ;
2.  $\|S\| \leq \sqrt{2n(9r + \sigma)}$ .

### 2.5.3. Secret key extraction algorithm

**ExtractLeft** ( $\mathbf{a}$ ,  $\mathbf{b}$ ,  $T_a$ ,  $u$ ,  $\sigma$ ). On input  $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_a$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{a}))$ ,  $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$ ,  $u \in \mathbb{R}_q$ ,  $\sigma \geq \|T_a\| \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ , then do:

1. Randomly sample a vector  $\mathbf{e}'_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^{m_2}$  distributed statistically close to  $D_{\mathbb{Z}^{m_2}, \sigma}$  and compute  $\mathbf{e}_2 = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}'_2) \in \mathbb{R}^{m_2}$ ;
2. Run **RingSamplePre** ( $\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{a})$ ,  $T_a$ ,  $u_1$ ,  $\sigma$ ) to get  $\mathbf{e}'_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^{m_1}$  and compute  $\mathbf{e}_1 = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}'_1) \in \mathbb{R}^{m_1}$ , where  $u_1 = u - \mathbf{b}^\top \mathbf{e}_2 \in \mathbb{R}_q$ ;
3. Output  $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}_1; \mathbf{e}_2) \in \mathbb{R}^{2m}$ .

**ExtractRight** ( $\mathbf{a}$ ,  $\mathbf{b}$ ,  $T_b$ ,  $R$ ,  $u$ ,  $\sigma$ ). On input  $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$ ,  $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_b$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{b}))$ ,  $R \in (\{-1, +1\}^n)^{m \times m}$ ,  $u \in \mathbb{R}_q$  and  $\sigma \geq \|T_b\| \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ , then do:

1. Set  $\mathbf{d} = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{R}^\top \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{R}^{2m}$ ;
2. Construct a trapdoor  $T_d$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{d}))$ , which is similar to [23];
3. Run **RingSamplePre** ( $\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{d})$ ,  $T_d$ ,  $u$ ,  $\sigma$ ) to get  $\mathbf{e}' \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$  and compute  $\mathbf{e} = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}') \in \mathbb{R}^{2m}$ ;
4. Output  $\mathbf{e}$ .

## 2.6. CP-ABE

**Definition 6.** (CP-ABE [3]) A CP-ABE scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (PK, MSK)$ . The *Setup* algorithm inputs a security parameter  $\kappa$  and produces the public key  $PK$  and master key  $MSK$ .
- $\text{KeyGen}(MSK, S) \rightarrow SK$ . The *KeyGen* algorithm inputs  $MSK$  and an attribute set  $S$  that depicts the key, then produces a secret key  $SK$ .
- $\text{Encrypt}(PK, T, M) \rightarrow CT$ . The *Encrypt* algorithm inputs  $PK$ , an access structure  $T$  and a message  $M$ . It encrypts  $M$  and produces a ciphertext  $CT$ . Suppose  $CT$  implicitly contains  $T$ .
- $\text{Decrypt}(PK, SK, CT) \rightarrow M$ . The *Decrypt* algorithm inputs  $PK$ ,  $SK$  and  $CT$ . It decrypts  $CT$  and outputs the message  $M$  if and only if  $S$  satisfies  $T$ .

## 2.7. CPA security game

The selective CPA security game for the CP-ABE scheme can be described like [19]. Before the *Setup* phase, the adversary  $A$  needs to state a challenge access structure  $T^*$  that he wishes to be challenged upon. Detailed steps of the selective security game are described in the following.

- *Initialization.*  $A$  picks  $T^*$  and sends it to the challenger  $C$ .
- *Setup.*  $C$  performs the *Setup* algorithm and gives  $PK$  to  $A$ .
- *Phase 1.*  $A$  submits an attribute set  $S$  for secret key query. The restriction is that  $S$  does not satisfy  $T^*$ . For  $S$ ,  $C$  performs the *KeyGen* algorithm and sends the secret key  $SK$  to  $A$ .
- *Challenge.*  $A$  sends two equal length messages  $M_0$  and  $M_1$  to  $C$ .  $C$  randomly selects one bit  $g \in \{0, 1\}$ , and encrypts  $M_g$  by running the *Encrypt* algorithm under  $T^*$ . Then,  $C$  returns a challenge ciphertext  $CT^*$  to  $A$ .
- *Phase 2.* The same as *Phase 1*.
- *Guess.*  $A$  produces a guess  $g'$  of  $g$ .

In the above selective security game,  $A$ 's advantage is

$$Adv(A) = |\Pr(g' = g) - 1/2|$$

**Definition 9.** A CP-ABE scheme is said to be selective CPA secure if all the PPT adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.

## 3. A small universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE

Based on the R-LWE problem, we propose a small universe CP-ABE scheme which is denoted as  $CP-ABE_{R-LWE}^s$ . For simplicity, we suppose there exists  $l$  normal attributes  $L = \{1, 2, \dots, l\}$  in the system. In  $CP-ABE_{R-LWE}^s$ , there is an access structure  $(T, t)$  being embedded in the ciphertext, which means that anyone who has  $t$  attributes in  $T$  can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the right message, where  $T \subseteq L$  and  $t \in \mathbb{Z}$  is a threshold whose maximum value is  $d$  ( $t \leq d \leq l$ ). In order to decrypt correctly, we need to introduce  $d$  default attributes  $D = \{l+1, \dots, l+d\}$  into our system, these default attributes should be handled in the *Setup* phase, and all users have to add these attributes to generate their secret keys. The data owner also needs to add some default attributes to generate the ciphertext according to the access structure. Let  $P = ((l+d)!)^2$ . Now, detailed steps of  $CP-ABE_{R-LWE}^s$  are described as follows.

- *Setup*( $1^\kappa$ )  $\rightarrow$  ( $PK, MSK$ ). On input a security parameter  $\kappa$  which is a power of 2, do:
  1. For each  $i \in L \cup D$ , use the **RingGenTrap** algorithm to select a vector  $\mathbf{b}_i \in R_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_{\mathbf{b}_i}$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^T(\mathbf{b}_i))$ .
  2. Set  $u = Pu'$  by randomly selecting  $u' \leftarrow R_q$ .
  3. Output the public key  $PK = \{\{\mathbf{b}_i \mid i \in L \cup D\}, u\}$  and master key  $MSK = \{T_{\mathbf{b}_i} \mid i \in L \cup D\}$ .
- *KeyGen*( $PK, MSK, U$ )  $\rightarrow$   $SK$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , the master key  $MSK$  and an attribute set  $U$ , do:
  1. Let  $u' = u/P$  and  $U' = U \cup D$ .
  2. Select a uniformly random polynomial  $p(y) = u' + \sum_{j=1}^d t_j y^j$  of degree  $d$ , where  $t_j \leftarrow R_q$ .

3. For each  $i \in U'$ , set  $u_i = p(i) \in R_q$  and perform **RingSamplePre** ( $Rot_f^T(\mathbf{b}_i)$ ,  $T_{\mathbf{b}_i}$ ,  $u_i$ ,  $\sigma$ ) to obtain  $\mathbf{e}_i'' \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ , then compute  $\mathbf{e}_i' = Map^{-1}(\mathbf{e}_i'')$  and  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}_i'$  (i.e.,  $\mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{e}_i = Pu_i$ ).
  4. Output the secret key  $SK = \{\mathbf{e}_i | i \in U'\}$ .
- **Encrypt** ( $PK, (T, t), \mathbf{m}$ )  $\rightarrow CT$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , an access structure  $(T, t)$  ( $1 \leq t \leq \min\{|T|, d\}$ ) and a message  $\mathbf{m} = (m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{n-1})$ , where  $m_i \in \{0, 1\}$ . Here,  $\mathbf{m}$  can be viewed as a coefficient vector of a polynomial  $m(x) = m_0 + m_1x + \dots + m_{n-1}x^{n-1} \in R_q$  ( $m$  for short), then do:
1. Choose a uniformly random element  $s \leftarrow R_q$ .
  2. Let  $T' = T \cup \{l+1, \dots, l+d-t+1\}$ .
  3. Set  $c' = su + x' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m$ , where  $x' \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha$ .
  4. For each  $i \in T'$ , compute  $\mathbf{c}_i = \mathbf{b}_i s + \mathbf{x}_i$ , where  $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha^m$ .
  5. Output the ciphertext  $CT = \{c', \{\mathbf{c}_i | i \in T'\}\}$ .
- **Decrypt** ( $PK, SK, CT$ )  $\rightarrow \mathbf{m}$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , the secret key  $SK$  and the ciphertext  $CT$ , then do:
1. If  $|U \cap T| < t$ , output  $\perp$ . Otherwise, choose a set  $I \subseteq U' \cap T'$  with  $|I| \geq d+1$ .
  2. For each  $i \in I$ , compute  $K_i = \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{c}_i$ .
  3. Compute
 
$$K = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) K_i$$
  4. Compute  $z = c' - K = z_0 + z_1x + \dots + z_{n-1}x^{n-1}$ .
  5. For  $i = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ , if  $|z_i| < q/4$ , then output  $m_i = 0$ , otherwise, output  $m_i = 1$ .

### 3.1. Correctness and parameter setting

In this subsection, we show that our construction is correct.

For each  $i \in I$ , compute

$$K_i = \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{c}_i = \mathbf{e}_i^T (\mathbf{b}_i \cdot s + \mathbf{x}_i) = (\mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{e}_i)^T s + \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i = Pu_i s + \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i$$

We have

$$\sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) u_i = i = \sum_{i=1}^l L_i(0) p(i) = u'$$

Then,

$$K = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) K_i = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) (Pu_i s + \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i) = us + \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i$$

Finally, compute

$$\begin{aligned} z &= c' - K \\ &= us + x' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m - us - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i \\ &= \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m + x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i \\ &\approx \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m \end{aligned}$$

To decrypt the ciphertext correctly, it requires that the absolute value of each coefficient of the error term  $(x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \mathbf{e}_i^T \mathbf{x}_i)$  is less than  $q/4$  with overwhelming probability. Here, we



only need to compute  $\|(x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0)e_i^T x_i)\|_\infty < q/4$ . Then

$$\|(x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0)e_i^T x_i)\|_\infty \leq \|x'\|_\infty + \|\sum_{i \in I} L_i(0)e_i^T x_i\|_\infty$$

By Lemma 2, we have  $\|x'\|_\infty < \alpha q \omega(\log n)$ . Let  $x_i = (x_{i1}, x_{i2}, \dots, x_{im})^T$  and  $e_i^T = (e'_{i1}, e'_{i2}, \dots, e'_{im})$ . Then

$$\|e_i^T x_i\|_\infty \leq \sum_{j=1}^m \|e'_{ij} x_{ij}\|_\infty < m \alpha q \omega(\log n) \cdot \|e'_{ij}\|$$

From Lemma 1,  $\|e'_{ij}\| < \sigma \sqrt{n}$ . Hence,

$$\|e_i^T x_i\|_\infty < m \alpha q \sigma \sqrt{n} \omega(\log n)$$

Let  $\alpha q = n \sqrt{\log n}$ . Since  $|PL_j(0)| \leq (n!)^3$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \|x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0)e_i^T x_i\|_\infty &< \alpha q \omega(\log n) + (d+1)((l+d)!)^3 m \alpha q \sigma \sqrt{n} \omega(\log n) \\ &< 4((l+d)!)^4 n^{2.5} \sigma \log^{1.5} n \end{aligned}$$

We set  $q \geq 16((l+d)!)^4 n^{2.5} \sigma \log^{1.5} n$  to ensure correctness. Simultaneously, other parameters are set as:

- $m = \kappa$  and  $n = m/2$ .
- $\sigma = m \cdot \omega(\log m)$ . In the *KeyGen* algorithm,  $e'_i$  obeys Gaussian distributions with center 0 and variance  $\sigma$ , while  $e_i = P e'_i$  obeys Gaussian distributions with center 0 and variance  $P^2 \sigma$ , and  $P^2 \sigma$  also satisfies  $P^2 \sigma = m \cdot \omega(\log m)$ .
- $l = n^\varepsilon$  for a certain constant  $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2)$ .
- Due to  $d \leq l$ , we have  $(l+d)! \leq (2l)! \leq (2l)^{2l} = 2^{2l \log 2l}$ , thus  $\alpha = n \sqrt{\log n} / q = 1 / (2^{8n^\varepsilon \log 2n^\varepsilon + 6} \cdot \text{poly}(n))$ .

Combining above parameter setting and Theorem 1, we get security under the hardness of  $2^{O(n^\varepsilon \log 2n^\varepsilon)}$ -approximating Ideal-SVP applying algorithms that run in time  $2^{O(n^\varepsilon \log 2n^\varepsilon)}$ .

### 3.2. Security analysis

Now, we reduce CPA security of  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^s$  to the decisional R-LWE assumption.

**Theorem 3.** If there exists a PPT adversary  $A$  can win the  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^s$  scheme with non-negligible advantage  $\varepsilon > 0$ , then there is a PPT algorithm  $B$  that can solve the decisional R-LWE assumption with the same advantage.

**Proof.** Recall from Definition 5 that a R-LWE assumption instance is provided as a sampling oracle  $O$  which can be either a truly random sampling oracle  $O_s$  or a pseudo-random sampling oracle  $O_s$  for a certain secret  $s \in R_q$ . The simulator  $B$  uses  $A$  to distinguish the two, and does as follows:

- *Instance:*  $B$  requests from  $O$  and obtains  $(l+d)m+1$  R-LWE samples  $(v_0, w_0) \in R_q \times R_q$ ,  $(v_i^j, w_i^j) \in R_q \times R_q$ ,  $(1 \leq i \leq l+d, 1 \leq j \leq m)$ , where  $v_0$  implies that there exists  $v'_0 \in R_q$  such that  $v_0 = P v'_0$ .
- *Initialization:*  $A$  picks a challenge access structure  $(T^*, t^*)$  ( $1 \leq t^* \leq \min\{|T^*|, d\}$ ) and sends it to  $A$ .

- *Setup*: After receiving  $(T^*, t^*)$ ,  $B$  generates the public key  $PK$  as:
1. Let  $T' = T^* \cup \{l+1, \dots, l+d+1-t^*\}$ .
  2. Set  $u = v_0$  and  $\mathbf{b}_i = (v_i^1, v_i^2, \dots, v_i^m)^T$  for each  $i \in T'$ .
  3. For each  $i \in (L \cup D) \setminus T'$ , use the **RingGenTrap** algorithm to choose  $\mathbf{b}_i \in R_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_{\mathbf{b}_i}$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^T(\mathbf{b}_i))$ .
- Finally,  $B$  sends  $PK = \{\{\mathbf{b}_i | i \in L \cup D\}, u\}$  to  $A$ , and keeps  $\{T_{\mathbf{b}_i} | i \in L \cup D\}$  secret.
- *Phase 1*:  $A$  can ask  $B$  to get the secret key  $SK$  corresponds to any attribute set  $U$ , where  $|U \cap T^*| < t^*$ .  $B$  creates  $SK$  as follows.
1. Let  $U' = U \cup D$  and  $|U \cap T^*| \leq t^* - 1$ . Then we have  $|U' \cap T'| \leq d$ . Assume that  $|U' \cap T'| = \eta$  and the first  $\eta$  attributes of  $U'$  are the same as  $T'$ .
  2. Represent the shares of  $u/P$  as  $p(y) = u/P + \sum_{j=1}^d t_j y^j$ , where  $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_d \leftarrow R_q$  are variables.
  3. For each  $i \in U' \cap T'$ , sample  $\mathbf{e}_i'' \leftarrow D_{Z_{mm}, \sigma}$ , compute  $\mathbf{e}_i' = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}_i'')$  and  $u_i = \mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{e}_i'$ . Then set  $p(i) = u_i$  and  $\mathbf{e}_i = P \mathbf{e}_i'$  for every  $i \in U' \cap T'$ .
  4. Since  $\eta \leq d$ , randomly choose  $d - \eta$  shares  $u_{\eta+1}, u_{\eta+2}, \dots, u_d \leftarrow R_q$  and set  $p(i) = u_i$  ( $i = \eta+1, \eta+2, \dots, d$ ). Then the values for  $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_d$  are determined. This determines all  $|U'|$  shares  $p(1), \dots, p(|U'|)$ .
  5. For each  $i \in U' \setminus T'$ , perform **RingSamplePre**  $(\mathbf{b}_i, T_{\mathbf{b}_i}, u_i, \sigma)$  to obtain  $\mathbf{e}_i''$ , then compute  $\mathbf{e}_i = P \cdot \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}_i'')$ .
- At last,  $B$  sends  $SK = \{\mathbf{e}_i | i \in U'\}$  to  $A$ .
- *Challenge*:  $A$  sends messages  $\mathbf{m}_0$  and  $\mathbf{m}_1$  to  $B$ , where  $\mathbf{m}_0 = (m_{00}, m_{01}, \dots, m_{0,n-1})$ ,  $\mathbf{m}_1 = (m_{10}, m_{11}, \dots, m_{1,n-1})$ ,  $m_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ ;  $j = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ . After receiving the messages,  $B$  picks  $\mathcal{G} \in \{0, 1\}$  at random and constructs the challenge ciphertext  $CT^*$  as:
- Set  $c' = w_0 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m_{\mathcal{G}}$ ;
  - For each  $i \in T'$ , set  $\mathbf{c}_i = (w_i^1, w_i^2, \dots, w_i^m)$ .
- $B$  sends  $CT^* = \{c', \{\mathbf{c}_i | i \in T'\}\}$  to  $A$ .
- *Phase 2*: The same as *Phase 1*.
- *Guess*:  $A$  produces a guess  $\mathcal{G}'$  of  $\mathcal{G}$ .  $B$  applies  $A$ 's guess to determine an answer on the R-LWE oracle: if  $\mathcal{G}' = \mathcal{G}$ ,  $B$  produces “R-LWE”, otherwise it produces “truly random”.
- If  $O$  is a R-LWE oracle for a certain secret  $s \in R_q$ , we show that  $CT^*$  is a valid ciphertext for  $s$  as follows:  $c' = w_0 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m_{\mathcal{G}} = v_0 s + x' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m_{\mathcal{G}}$ , and  $\mathbf{c}_i = (w_i^1, w_i^2, \dots, w_i^m) = \mathbf{b}_i s + \mathbf{x}_i$  for each  $i \in T'$ . If the probability that  $A$  guesses the right  $\mathcal{G}$  is  $\varepsilon + 1/2$ , then  $B$  can win the game with the same probability.
- If  $O$  is  $O_s$ , the ciphertext  $CT^*$  is completely random from  $A$ 's view, thus the probability that  $A$  guesses the right  $\mathcal{G}$  is  $1/2$ ,  $B$  also has the same probability to win the game.
- Therefore, if  $A$  can win the above security game with non-negligible advantage  $\varepsilon > 0$ , then  $B$  can solve the decisional R-LWE assumption with the same advantage

$$\begin{aligned}
Adv(B) &= |\Pr[B^{O_s} = 1] - \Pr[B^{O_s^*} = 1]| \\
&= |\varepsilon + 1/2 - 1/2| \\
&= \varepsilon
\end{aligned}$$

#### 4. A large-universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE

The proposed scheme in Section 3 is bounded in selecting parameters for key generation and encryption once the public parameters have been set. And the expression of attribute is not flexible enough. In order to support unbounded attribute space and improve the expressiveness of attribute, we combine the above scheme and some fixed FRD function to construct a large universe CP-ABE scheme which is denoted as  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^l$ .

**Definition 10.** [23] Let  $q$  be a prime. If there is a function  $H : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$  satisfies:

- for all the different  $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , the matrix  $H(u) - H(v) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$  is full rank;
- $H$  is computable in polynomial time in  $n \log q$ .

Then we call  $H$  is an encoding with full-rank differences (FRD).

Suppose there exists  $l$  normal attributes  $L = \{\text{attr}_1, \text{attr}_2, \dots, \text{attr}_l\}$  in the system. Each polynomial in  $R_q$  is the possible value of  $\text{attr}_i$ . Let  $t_i \ll \text{attr}_i$  denote  $t_i \in R_q$  is a value of  $\text{attr}_i$ , where  $i = 1, 2, \dots, l$ . Now, detailed steps of  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^l$  are described as follows.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (PK, MSK)$ . On input a security parameter  $\kappa$  which is a power of 2, do:
  1. Use the **RingGenTrap** algorithm to select a vector  $\mathbf{a} \in R_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_a$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^T(\mathbf{a}))$ .
  2. For each  $i \in L \cup D$ , select a uniformly random vector  $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow R_q^m$ .
  3. Select a uniformly random vector  $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_m) \leftarrow R_q^m$ .
  4. Set  $u = Pu'$  by selecting  $u' \leftarrow R_q$  at random.
  5. Select a FDR function  $H : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ .
  6. Output the public key  $PK = \{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \{\mathbf{b}_i | i \in L \cup D\}, u, H\}$  and master key  $MSK = \{T_a\}$ .
- $\text{KeyGen}(PK, MSK, U) \rightarrow SK$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , the master key  $MSK$  and an attribute set  $U = \{t_i | t_i \ll \text{attr}_i\}$ , do:
  1. Let  $u' = u/P$  and  $U' = U \cup D$ .
  2. Compute  $\mathbf{B} = \text{Trans}_{V \rightarrow M}(\mathbf{b})$ .
  3. Select a uniformly random polynomial  $p(y) = u' + \sum_{j=1}^d t_j y^j$  of degree  $d$ , where  $t_j \leftarrow R_q$ .
  4. For each  $i \in U$ , compute  $\mathbf{h}_i = \text{Trans}_{M \rightarrow V}(\mathbf{B}H^T(t_i)) \in R_q^m$ , set  $u_i = p(i) \in R_q$  and  $E_i = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{b}_i + \mathbf{h}_i)$ , then perform **ExtractLeft**  $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}_i + \mathbf{h}_i, T_a, u_i, \sigma)$  to obtain  $\mathbf{e}'_i \in R_q^{2m}$ , and compute  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}'_i$ .
  5. For every  $i \in D$ , set  $u_i = p(i) \in R_q$  and  $E_i = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{b}_i) \in R_q^{2m}$ , then perform **ExtractLeft**  $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{b}_i, T_a, u_i, \sigma)$  to obtain  $\mathbf{e}'_i \in R_q^{2m}$ , and compute  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}'_i$ .
  6. Output the secret key  $SK = \{\mathbf{e}_i | i \in U'\}$ .

- *Encrypt* ( $PK, (T, t), m$ )  $\rightarrow CT$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , an access structure  $(T, t)$  and a message  $m = (m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{n-1})$ , where  $T = \{t_i \mid t_i \ll attr_i\}$ ,  $1 \leq t \leq \min\{|T|, d\}$  and  $m_i \in \{0, 1\}$ . Here,  $m$  is viewed as a coefficient vector of a polynomial  $m(x) = m_0 + m_1x + \dots + m_{n-1}x^{n-1} \in R_q$  ( $m$  for short), do:
1. Choose a uniformly random element  $s \leftarrow R_q$ .
  2. Compute  $B = Trans_{V \rightarrow M}(b)$ .
  3. Let  $V = \{l+1, \dots, l+d-t+1\}$  and  $T' = T \cup V$ .
  4. Set  $c' = us + x' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m$ , where  $x' \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha$ .
  5. Set  $c_0 = as + x$ , where  $x \leftarrow \bar{\gamma}_\alpha^m$ .
  6. For each  $i \in T$ , compute  $h_i = Trans_{M \rightarrow V}(BH^T(t_i)) \in R_q^m$ , randomly select  $R_i \leftarrow (\{-1, +1\})^{m \times m}$  and compute  $c_i = (b_i + h_i)s + R_i^T x$ .
  7. For each  $i \in V$ , select  $R_i \leftarrow (\{-1, +1\})^{m \times m}$  at random and compute  $c_i = (b + b_i)s + R_i^T x$ .
  8. Output the ciphertext  $CT = \{T, c', c_0, \{c_i \mid i \in T'\}\}$ .
- *Decrypt* ( $PK, SK, CT$ )  $\rightarrow m$ . On input the public key  $PK$ , the secret key  $SK$  and the ciphertext  $CT$ , then do:
1. If  $|U \cap T| < t$ , output  $\perp$ . Otherwise, let  $U' \cap T' \geq d+1$ . Randomly choose a subset  $I \in U' \cap T'$  with  $|I| = d+1$ . Let  $S_1$  denote the subscript set of normal attributes in  $I$ , and  $S_2$  denote the default attributes in  $I$ . For convenience, we set  $I = S_1 \cup S_2$ .
  2. For each  $i \in I$ , compute  $K_i = e_i^T(c_0; c_i)$ .
  3. Compute
 
$$K = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0)K_i$$
  4. Compute  $z = c' - K = z_0 + z_1x + \dots + z_{n-1}x^{n-1}$ .
  5. For  $i = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ , if  $|z_i| < q/4$ , then output  $m_i = 0$ , otherwise, output  $m_i = 1$ .

#### 4.1. Correctness

In this subsection, we show that the CP-ABE $_{R-LWE}^l$  scheme is correct.

Suppose  $|S_1| = t$ ,  $|S_2| = d+1-t$ . For each  $i \in S_1$ , compute

$$\begin{aligned} K_i &= e_i^T \begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_i \end{pmatrix} \\ &= e_i^T \begin{pmatrix} as + x \\ (b_i + h_i)s + R_i^T x \end{pmatrix} \\ &= e_i^T (E_i s) + e_i^T \begin{pmatrix} x \\ R_i^T x \end{pmatrix} \\ &= Pu_i s + e_i^T \begin{pmatrix} x \\ R_i^T x \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

For each  $i \in S_2$ , compute

$$\begin{aligned}
K_i &= \mathbf{e}_i^\top \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{c}_0 \\ \mathbf{c}_i \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \mathbf{e}_i^\top \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{a}s + \mathbf{x} \\ (\mathbf{b} + \mathbf{b}_i)s + \mathbf{R}_i^\top \mathbf{x} \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \mathbf{e}_i^\top (E_i s) + \mathbf{e}_i^\top \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{R}_i^\top \mathbf{x} \end{pmatrix} \\
&= Pu_i s + \mathbf{e}_i^\top \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{R}_i^\top \mathbf{x} \end{pmatrix}
\end{aligned}$$

For every  $i \in I$ , let  $\xi_i = K_i - Pu_i s$ . Then,

$$K = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) K_i = \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) (Pu_i s + \xi_i) = us + \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \xi_i$$

Finally, compute

$$\begin{aligned}
z &= c' - K \\
&= us + x' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m - us - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \xi_i \\
&= \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m + x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \xi_i \\
&\approx \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m
\end{aligned}$$

As Subsection 3.1, we can select appropriate parameters to satisfy

$$\|x' - \sum_{i \in I} L_i(0) \xi_i\|_\infty < q/4$$

## 4.2. Security analysis

In this subsection, we prove the security of  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^l$  in the selective model in Subsection 2.7.

**Theorem 4.** If there exists a PPT adversary  $A$  can win the  $\text{CP-ABE}_{\text{R-LWE}}^l$  scheme with non-negligible advantage  $\varepsilon > 0$ , then there is a PPT algorithm  $B$  that can solve the decisional R-LWE assumption with the same advantage.

**Proof.** Recall from Definition 5 that a R-LWE assumption instance is provided as a sampling oracle  $O$  which can be either a truly random sampling oracle  $O_\$$  or a pseudo-random sampling oracle  $O_s$  for a certain secret  $s \in R_q$ . The simulator  $B$  uses  $A$  to distinguish the two, and does:

- *Instance:*  $B$  requests from  $O$  and obtains  $m+1$  R-LWE samples  $(v_i, w_i) \in R_q \times R_q$  ( $0 \leq i \leq m$ ), where  $v_0$  implies that there exists  $v'_0 \in R_q$  such that  $v_0 = Pv'_0$ .
- *Initialization:*  $A$  sends a challenge access structure  $(T^*, t^*)$  to  $A$ , where  $T^* = \{t_i^* \mid t_i^* \ll \text{attr}_i\}$  and  $1 \leq t^* \leq \min\{|T^*|, d\}$ .
- *Setup:* After receiving  $(T^*, t^*)$ ,  $B$  generates the public key  $PK$  as follows:
  1. Let  $V = \{l+1, \dots, l+d+1-t^*\}$  and  $T' = T^* \cup V$ .
  2. Set  $u = v_0$  and  $\mathbf{a} = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m)^\top \in R_q^m$ .
  3. Use the **RingGenTrap** algorithm to choose  $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_m) \in R_q^m$  and a trapdoor  $T_b$  of  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\text{Rot}_f^\top(\mathbf{b}))$ . Simultaneously, compute  $\mathbf{B} = \text{Trans}_{V \rightarrow M}(\mathbf{b})$ .

4. For each  $i \in T^*$ , compute  $\mathbf{h}_i = \text{Trans}_{M \rightarrow V}(\mathbf{B}\mathbf{H}^T(t_i)) \in R_q^m$ , select  $\mathbf{R}_i \in (\{-1, +1\}^n)^{m \times m}$  at random and set  $\mathbf{b}_i = \mathbf{R}_i^T \mathbf{a} - \mathbf{h}_i$ .
  5. For every  $i \in L \setminus T^*$ , select  $\mathbf{R}_i \in (\{-1, +1\}^n)^{m \times m}$  randomly and set  $\mathbf{b}_i = \mathbf{R}_i^T \mathbf{a}$ .
  6. For each  $i \in V$ , select  $\mathbf{R}_i \in (\{-1, +1\}^n)^{m \times m}$  at random and set  $\mathbf{b}_i = \mathbf{R}_i^T \mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}$ .
  7. For each  $i \in D \setminus V$ , randomly choose  $\mathbf{R}_i \in (\{-1, +1\}^n)^{m \times m}$  and set  $\mathbf{b}_i = \mathbf{R}_i^T \mathbf{a}$ .
- Finally,  $B$  sends  $PK = \{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \{\mathbf{b}_i \mid i \in L \cup D\}, u\}$  to  $A$ , and keeps  $(T_b, \{\mathbf{R}_i \mid i \in L \cup D\})$  secret.
- *Phase 1:*  $A$  can ask  $B$  to get the secret key  $SK$  corresponds to any attribute set  $U = \{t_i \mid t_i \ll \text{attr}_i\}$ , where  $|U \cap T^*| < t^*$ .  $B$  creates  $SK$  as follows.
1. Let  $U' = U \cup D$  and  $|U \cap T^*| \leq t^* - 1$ . Then we have  $|U' \cap T'| \leq d$ . Assume that  $|U' \cap T'| = \eta$  and the first  $\eta$  attributes of  $U'$  are the same as  $T'$ .
  2. Represent the shares of  $u/P$  as  $p(y) = u/P + \sum_{j=1}^d t_j y^j$ , where  $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_d \leftarrow R_q$  are variables.
  3. For each  $i \in U$ , compute  $\mathbf{h}_i = \text{Trans}_{M \rightarrow V}(\mathbf{B}\mathbf{H}^T(t_i)) \in R_q^m$ , define  $E_i = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{b}_i + \mathbf{h}_i)$ , sample  $\mathbf{e}_i'' \leftarrow D_{Z^{2mn}, \sigma}$ , compute  $\mathbf{e}_i' = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}_i'')$  and  $u_i = E_i^T \mathbf{e}_i'$ . Then set  $p(i) = u_i$  and  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}_i'$  for every  $i \in U$ .
  4. For each  $i \in V$ , define  $E_i = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{b}_i)$ , sample  $\mathbf{e}_i'' \leftarrow D_{Z^{2mn}, \sigma}$ , compute  $\mathbf{e}_i' = \text{Map}^{-1}(\mathbf{e}_i'')$  and  $u_i = E_i^T \mathbf{e}_i'$ . Then set  $p(i) = u_i$  and  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}_i'$  for every  $i \in V$ .
  5. Since  $\eta \leq d$ , randomly choose  $d - \eta$  shares  $u_{\eta+1}, u_{\eta+2}, \dots, u_d \leftarrow R_q$  and set  $p(i) = u_i$  ( $i = \eta+1, \eta+2, \dots, d$ ). Then the values for  $t_1, t_2, \dots, t_d$  are determined. This determines all  $|U'|$  shares  $p(1), \dots, p(|U'|)$ .
  6. For every  $i \in D \setminus V$ , take  $E_i = (\mathbf{a}; \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{b}_i)$  and perform **ExtractRight**  $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{R}_i, T_b, u_i, \sigma)$  to obtain  $\mathbf{e}_i'$ , then compute  $\mathbf{e}_i = P\mathbf{e}_i'$ .
- At last,  $B$  sends  $SK = \{\mathbf{e}_i \mid i \in U'\}$  to  $A$ .
- *Challenge:*  $A$  sends messages  $\mathbf{m}_0$  and  $\mathbf{m}_1$  to  $B$ , where  $\mathbf{m}_0 = (m_{00}, m_{01}, \dots, m_{0,n-1})$ ,  $\mathbf{m}_1 = (m_{10}, m_{11}, \dots, m_{1,n-1})$ ,  $m_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $i = 0, 1$ ;  $j = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ . After receiving the messages,  $B$  picks  $\mathcal{G} \in \{0, 1\}$  at random and constructs the challenge ciphertext  $CT^*$  as:
- Let  $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, w_2, \dots, w_m)$ ;
  - Set  $c' = w_0 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m_{\mathcal{G}}$  and  $\mathbf{c}_0 = \mathbf{w}$ ;
  - If  $i \in T'$ , set  $\mathbf{c}_i = \mathbf{R}_i^T \mathbf{w}$ .
- $B$  sends  $CT^* = \{c', \mathbf{c}_0, \{\mathbf{c}_i \mid i \in T'\}\}$  to  $A$ .
- *Phase 2:* The same as *Phase 1*.
- *Guess:*  $A$  produces a guess  $\mathcal{G}'$  of  $\mathcal{G}$ .  $B$  applies  $A$ 's guess to determine an answer on the R-LWE oracle: if  $\mathcal{G}' = \mathcal{G}$ ,  $B$  produces “R-LWE”, otherwise it produces “truly random”.

## 5. Performance analysis

We compare the performance of our schemes with the existing schemes in [19]. We denote the first scheme in [19] as CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>s</sup>, and the second one as CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>l</sup>. In order to make the

analysis more understandable, new notations used in comparison are shown as follows:

$l$ : the number of the attribute universe

$k$ : the number of attributes a user has

$t$ : the number of the least attributes to decrypt the ciphertext

$\theta$ : the number of attributes appeared in the access structure

$\delta$ : a real such that  $n^{1+\delta} > \lceil (n+1)\log q + \omega(\log n) \rceil$  (in [19])

**Table 1** shows the performance comparison results among our schemes and the ones in [19], each scheme is compared in terms of  $PK$  size,  $SK$  size,  $message$  size,  $CT$  size, multiplications in encryption per bit (MEPB), multiplications in decryption per bit (MDPB), underlying hardness assumption (UHA), principle of operation (POO) and worst case problem (WCP). All sizes are in bits. For convenience, we let  $v = \theta + l - t + 1$  and  $w = \log q$ .

**Table 1.** Performance comparison among our schemes and the ones in [19]

Schemes	Small universe		Large universe	
	CP-ABE <sub>LWE</sub> <sup>s</sup>	CP-ABE <sub>R-LWE</sub> <sup>s</sup>	CP-ABE <sub>LWE</sub> <sup>l</sup>	CP-ABE <sub>R-LWE</sub> <sup>l</sup>
$PK$ size	$[(12l+12)n^{1+\delta}+1]nw$	$(4l+4)n+1nw$	$[(12l+12)n^{1+\delta}+1]nw$	$[(4l+4)n+1]nw$
$SK$ size	$(2k+2l)n^{1+\delta}w$	$(2k+2l)n^2w$	$(2k+2l)n^{1+\delta}w$	$(4k+4l)n^2w$
$Message$ size	$\{0,1\}$	$\{0,1\}^n$	$\{0,1\}$	$\{0,1\}^n$
$CT$ size	$[(v+1)n^{1+\delta}+1]w$	$(2vn+1)nw$	$[(v+1)n^{1+\delta}+1]w$	$[(2v+2)n+1]nw$
MEPB	$O(vn^{2+2\delta})$	$O(vn \log n)$	$O(vn^{3+3\delta})$	$O(vn^2 \log n)$
MDPB	$O(l n^{1+\delta})$	$O(l n \log n)$	$O(l n^{1+\delta})$	$O(l n \log n)$
UHA	LWE	R-LWE	LWE	R-LWE
POO	Matrix operation	FFT	Matrix operation	FFT
WCP	$SIVP_\gamma$	$\gamma - Ideal - SVP$	$SIVP_\gamma$	$\gamma - Ideal - SVP$

As shown in **Table 1**, compared with CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>s</sup> and CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>l</sup> in [19],  $PK$  size in our schemes are reduced nearly  $3n$  times when encrypting messages of the same size, our schemes also have smaller  $SK$  size and  $CT$  size. Our schemes require less computation in the encryption and decryption phases, mainly because our scheme is constructed based on the R-LWE assumption, which can use FFT to improve the efficiency of encryption from  $O(vn^2)$  to  $O(vn \log n)$  and decryption from  $O(l n^2)$  to  $O(l n \log n)$ . Especially, MEPB in CP-ABE<sub>R-LWE</sub><sup>s</sup> is  $O(vn \log n)$ , which is much more less than that in CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>s</sup>. In **Table 1**, CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>s</sup> and CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>l</sup> are secure under the LWE assumption, which can be reduced to  $SIVP_\gamma$  on arbitrary lattices; while our schemes are secure under the R-LWE assumption, which also can be reduced to  $\gamma$ -Ideal-SVP on ideal lattices. As a whole, our schemes are secure and more efficient than CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>s</sup> and CP-ABE<sub>LWE</sub><sup>l</sup> in [19].

## 6. Conclusion

Based on the R-LWE assumption, a small universe CP-ABE scheme is proposed, which has a flexible and simple threshold access structure. On this basis, we proposed a large universe CP-ABE scheme from R-LWE with the help of a FRD function, which can achieve unbounded

attribute space and enhance the expressiveness of attribute. Both schemes are proved to be secure under the R-LWE assumption. Moreover, we compared our schemes with the schemes in [19], and then found that ours are more efficient and have shorter public key, secret key and ciphertext sizes.

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