An Analytical Hierarchy Process Combined with Game Theory for Interface Selection in 5G Heterogeneous Networks

• Mostafa Zaman Chowdhury,
• Md. Tashikur Rahman,
• Yeong Min Jang,

Vol. 14, No. 4, April 30, 2020
10.3837/tiis.2020.04.022, Download Paper (Free):

• AHP
• game theory
• network-selection
• network attributes
• Nash equilibrium
• payoff
• RANs
• strategic game

Abstract

Network convergence is considered as one of the key solutions to the problem of achieving future high-capacity and reliable communications. This approach overcomes the limitations of separate wireless technologies. Efficient interface selection is one of the most important issues in convergence networks. This paper solves the problem faced by users of selecting the most appropriate interface in the heterogeneous radio-access network (RAN) environment. Our proposed scheme combines a hierarchical evaluation of networks and game theory to solve the network-selection problem. Instead, of considering a fixed weight system while ranking the networks, the proposed scheme considers the service requirements, as well as static and dynamic network attributes. The best network is selected for a particular service request. To establish a hierarchy among the network-evaluation criteria for service requests, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used. To determine the optimum network selection, the network hierarchy is combined with game theory. AHP attains the network hierarchy. The weights of different access networks for a service are calculated. It is performed by combining AHP scores considering user’s experienced static network attributes and dynamic radio parameters. This paper provides a strategic game. In this game, the network scores of service requests for various RANs and the user’s willingness to pay for these services are used to model a network-versus-user game. The Nash equilibria signify those access networks that are chosen by individual user and result maximum payoff. The examples for the interface selection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

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