

# Toward Efficient Convertible Authenticated Encryption Schemes Using Self-Certified Public Key System

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## **Abstract**

Convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) schemes enable the signer to send a confidential message and its corresponding signature to the designated recipient. The recipient can also convert the signature into a conventional one which can be verified by anyone. Integrating the properties of self-certified public key systems, this paper presents efficient and computationally indistinguishable self-certified CAE schemes for strengthening the security of E-Commerce applications. Additionally, we also adapt the proposed schemes to elliptic curve systems for facilitating the applications of limited computing power and insufficient storage space. The proposed schemes are secure against known existential active attacks, satisfy the semantic security requirement, and have the following advantages: (i) No extra certificate is required since the tasks of authenticating the public key and verifying the signature can be simultaneously carried out within one step, which helps reducing computation efforts and communication overheads. (ii) In case of a later dispute, the recipient can convert the signature into an ordinary one for the public arbitration. (iii) The signature conversion can be solely performed by the recipient without additional computation efforts or communication overheads. (iv) The recipient of the signature can prove himself, if needed, to anyone that he is actually the designated recipient.

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**Keywords:** authenticated encryption, self-certified public key, convertibility, elliptic curve, semantic security

## 1. Introduction

In the field of cryptography, how to satisfy the requirements of integrity [1], confidentiality [2], authenticity [1] and non-repudiation [3] over open environments of the Internet is always an important issue. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [4] introduced the first public key system based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [4, 5]. In the system, each user owns a self-chosen private key and a corresponding public key stored in the public key directory. One can use his private key along with the designated user's public key to compute a shared common key and thus to construct a secure channel between them. With the public key cryptosystems [6, 7], we can further perform the functions of the public key encryption or the digital signature. However, a malicious adversary can plot an active attack by substituting a fake public key for the genuine one.

To withstand the above attack, a certificate-based approach (e.g., X.509) [8] is a commonly used solution. Each public key is accompanied with a certificate issued by the certification authority to guarantee its authenticity. One should first verify the public key before using it. However, it requires extra communication overheads and computation efforts owing to the processes of transmitting and verifying the certificate.

In 1984, Shamir [9] addressed the concept of ID-based public key systems in which each user's public key is straightly his public identifier, so as to be explicitly verified without any extra certificate. The corresponding private key is derived by the system authority (SA) through a trapdoor one-way hash function which is computationally infeasible to invert. Without the SA's secret information, no one can obtain a valid private key. Nevertheless, the SA can still impersonate any legitimate user without being detected since he has the control over every user's private key. That is, the SA should be always trusted.

Seeing that the security of ID-based public key systems places great dependence on the SA and users cannot freely choose his own private key, Girault [10] proposed a self-certified public key system to eliminate these drawbacks in 1991. A self-certified public key system has the property that the public key validation can be combined with other subsequent cryptographic mechanisms such as the signature verification. That is, the tasks of authenticating the public key and verifying the signature can be simultaneously achieved in one step, which reduces the costs of the certificate transmission and public key verification. As compared with the stated two systems, a self-certified public key system is more efficient. It might be a better alternative for implementing cryptographic systems.

To meet requirements of some specific applications that digital signatures must simultaneously fulfill the need of confidentiality, such as the delivery of military documents or transactions of credit cards, a flat-out way would be the conventional two-step approach [11], i.e., first sign then encrypt. However, the two-step approach is inefficient since the costs equal to the sum of those of signing and encryption. To improve the efficiency, an authenticated encryption scheme was proposed by Horster *et al.* [12] in 1994, which only allows a designated recipient to verify the signature rather than anyone else for the purpose of confidentiality. Obviously, the authenticated encryption scheme outperforms the traditional two-step approach in terms of computation complexities and communication overheads. In 2005, Yoon and Yoo [13] extended the applications for message linkages. Yet, a later dispute that the signer disclaims having generated a signature might occur. To convince anyone of the signer's dishonesty, the designated recipient must have the ability to

convert the signature into an ordinary one for protecting his rights or benefits. In 1999, Araki *et al.* [14] put the concept of signature conversion into practice and proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme. However, the process of signature conversion requires the assistance of the signer, which might be infeasible if the signer is unwilling to cooperate with. To improve the conversion mechanism and obtain better performance, Wu and Hsu [15] proposed a convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme in which the signature conversion process is rather simple and can be solely done by the recipient without any computation efforts. Their scheme has to perform extra public key verification before any cryptographic mechanism and does not provide the property of recipient proof. Chen and Jan [16] further proposed an enhanced scheme in the same year. However, both the Wu-Hsu and the Chen-Jan schemes cannot provide the semantic security, i.e., the ciphertext is computationally distinguishable with respect to two candidate messages. To eliminate such security weakness, Lv *et al.* [17] proposed a secure and practical solution. Yet, the computation complexity of their scheme is rather high. Since then, many variations of self-certified CAE were proposed, for instance, self-certified proxy CAE [18, 19] and convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme [20, 21], which can be used in different application situations. Interested readers can refer to these literatures [15, 17-21] for more detailed discussions. Elaborating on the merits inherent in the self-certified public key systems, the authors will propose efficient and computationally indistinguishable self-certified CAE schemes in this paper.

With the coming of the digitalized time, lots of mobile devices like mobile phones have been widely used around. Equipped with less powerful computing capability and small storage space, those devices can only be used to execute fewer computations and store limited personal sensitive data. No one can gain the access to the data inside without authorization. Due to the limited computing power and storage space, the computation complexity and the storage requirement are concerned the most when we implement a cryptographic scheme for those devices. The elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [22-27] first introduced by Koblitz [28] and Miller [29] is applicable to this kind of applications used in mobile devices. A significant characteristic of the ECC is that the key length is shorter than that of the conventional cryptography under the same level of security, which helps faster execution and more bandwidth savings. As we elevate the security level, the difference of the key length between the ECC and the conventional cryptography dramatically increases. Therefore, we also adapt the proposed schemes to elliptic curve systems for facilitating the gradually widely used applications of limited computing power and insufficient storage. To ensure the authenticity of transaction certificates is the foundation for any secure E-commerce application. In our proposed schemes, the tasks of authenticating the public key, corresponding certificates and the signature can be simultaneously carried out in one logical step, which greatly reduces the costs of transmitting certificates and verifying public keys. Moreover, under the same security level, the elliptic curve variants with shorter key length helps with faster execution and more bandwidth savings. Therefore, our proposed schemes can strengthen the security of E-commerce application.

## 2. Self-Certified CAE Schemes Based on Discrete Logarithms

The proposed self-certified CAE schemes are divided into four stages: the user registration, the signature generation and verification, the signature conversion, and the recipient proof stages. There is also a system authority (SA) whose tasks are to initialize the system and to

help users generating their key pairs. Initially, the SA chooses the following necessary parameters:

- $p, q$ : two large primes satisfying that  $q \mid (p - 1)$ ;
- $g$ : a generator of order  $q$  over  $\text{GF}(p)$ ;
- $h(\cdot)$ : a secure one-way hash function which accepts input of any length and generates a fixed length output;
- $\gamma$ : the SA's private key  $\gamma \in Z_q^*$ ;
- $\beta$ : the SA's public key computed as
 
$$\beta = g^\gamma \text{ mod } p. \tag{1}$$

All the above parameters are made public except for the SA's private key  $\gamma$ . Details of each stage are described as below and shown in **Fig. 1**:

**The user registration stage:** To join the system, each user  $U_i$  associated with the identifier  $ID_i$  has to perform the following interactive steps with the SA to obtain a private-public key pair:

**Step 1**  $U_i$  first chooses an integer  $t_i \in Z_q^*$  to compute

$$v_i = g^{h(t_i, ID_i)} \text{ mod } p, \tag{2}$$

and then deliveries  $(v_i, ID_i)$  to the SA.

**Step 2** Upon receiving  $(v_i, ID_i)$ , the SA chooses  $z_i \in Z_q^*$  to compute

$$y_i = v_i h(ID_i)^{-1} g^{z_i} \text{ mod } p, \tag{3}$$

$$w_i = z_i + h(y_i, ID_i) \gamma \text{ mod } q, \tag{4}$$

and sends  $(y_i, w_i)$  back to  $U_i$ .

**Step 3**  $U_i$  computes his private key  $x_i$  as

$$x_i = w_i + h(t_i, ID_i) \text{ mod } q, \tag{5}$$

and then ensures its validity by checking

$$\beta^{h(y_i, ID_i) h(ID_i) y_i} \stackrel{?}{=} g^{x_i} \text{ (mod } p). \tag{6}$$

If it holds,  $U_i$  accepts  $(x_i, y_i)$  as his private-public key pair. The correctness of Eq. (6) can be easily confirmed as Theorem 1, which also validates the authenticity of  $y_i$  with respect to  $x_i$ .

**Theorem 1.** A valid key pair  $(x_i, y_i)$  can pass the test of Eq. (6).

**Proof:** From the left-hand side of Eq. (6), we have

$$\beta^{h(y_i, ID_i) h(ID_i) y_i} = \beta^{h(y_i, ID_i)} v_i g^{z_i} \tag{by Eq. (3)}$$

$$= v_i g^{z_i + h(y_i, ID_i) \gamma} \quad (\text{by Eq. (1)})$$

$$= g^{h(t_i, ID_i)} g^{z_i + h(y_i, ID_i) \gamma} \quad (\text{by Eq. (2)})$$

$$= g^{h(t_i, ID_i) + w_i} \quad (\text{by Eq. (4)})$$

$$= g^{x_i} \pmod{p} \quad (\text{by Eq. (5)})$$

which equals to the right-hand side of Eq. (6).

Q.E.D.

**The signature generation and verification stage:** When  $U_a$  wants to send  $U_b$  the signature of a confidential message  $m$  with embedded redundancy.  $U_a$  first chooses an integer  $k \in Z_q^*$  to compute  $(C, r_1, r_2)$  as Eqs. (7), (8) and (9), respectively:

$$C = (\beta^{h(y_b, ID_b)} h(ID_b) y_b)^k \pmod{p}, \quad (7)$$

$$r_1 = mh(C)^{-1} \pmod{p}, \quad (8)$$

$$r_2 = h(m, h(g^k \pmod{p}), C) \pmod{q}. \quad (9)$$

$U_a$  then compute  $s$  as Eq. (10.\*) in **Table 1**, where ‘\*’ represents one letter of ‘a’ to ‘f’. Each equation is a secure combination of three parameters  $k$ ,  $x_a$  and  $r_2$ .

**Table 1.** Equations to generate signature  $s$

I	$s = k(1 + x_a r_2)^{-1} \pmod{q}$	(10.a)
II	$s = x_a^{-1}(k r_2 - 1) \pmod{q}$	(10.b)
III	$s = k - x_a r_2 \pmod{q}$	(10.c)
IV	$s = k^{-1}(r_2 + x_a) \pmod{q}$	(10.d)
V	$s = k r_2 + x_a \pmod{q}$	(10.e)
VI	$s = x_a^{-1}(k - r_2) \pmod{q}$	(10.f)




Fig. 1. Illustration of proposed self-certified CAE schemes based on Discrete Logarithms

**Table 2.** Equations to compute  $K$

I	$K = g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^{sr_2} \text{ mod } p^{\frac{1}{2}}$	(11.a)
II	$K = (g (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^s)^{r_2^{-1}} \text{ mod } p$	(11.b)
III	$K = g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^{r_2} \text{ mod } p$	(11.c)
IV	$K = (g^{r_2} (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a))^s \text{ mod } p$	(11.d)
V	$K = (g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^{-1})^{r_2^{-1}} \text{ mod } p$	(11.e)
VI	$K = g^{r_2} (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^s \text{ mod } p$	(11.f)

Here,  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  is the signature for  $m$ , which is then delivered to the designated recipient  $U_b$ . After receiving the signature,  $U_b$  first computes  $K$  from Eq. (11.\*) of **Table 2** and  $C'$  from Eq. (12). Note that the computation of  $K$  depends on the generation of  $s$ , e.g., generating  $s$  with Eq. (10.c) implies deriving  $K$  with Eq. (11.c).

$$C' = K^{xb} \text{ mod } p \quad (12)$$

The message  $m$  with the embedded redundancy can be recovered by Eq. (13).

$$m = h(C') \eta \text{ mod } p \quad (13)$$

$U_b$  finally verifies signature  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  by checking the following equation:

$$r_2 = h(m, h(K), C') \text{ mod } q \quad (14)$$

If it holds, the signature is valid. In the mean time, the signer's public key  $y_a$  is simultaneously authenticated.

Take scheme I (with  $s$  and  $K$  separately computed as Eqs. (10.a) and (11.a)) as an example. We demonstrate that Eqs. (13) and (14) work correctly as the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, respectively. The correctness of the other schemes can be assured with the similar way.

**Theorem 2.** The designated recipient  $U_b$  can recover the message  $m$  with Eq. (13).

**Proof:** From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have

$$\begin{aligned} & h(C') \eta \\ &= h(K^{xb} \text{ mod } p) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (12))} \\ &= h(((\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a)^{sr_2} g^s)^{xb} \text{ mod } p) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (11.a))} \\ &= h((g^{s(1+x_a r_2)})^{xb} \text{ mod } p) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (6))} \\ &= h(g^{xbk} \text{ mod } p) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (10.a))} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= h((\beta^{h(y_b, ID_b)})_{h(ID_b)y_b})^k \pmod p) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (6))} \\
&= h(C) \eta && \text{(by Eq. (7))} \\
&= m \pmod p && \text{(by Eq. (8))}
\end{aligned}$$

which equals to the left-hand side of Eq. (13).

Q.E.D.

**Theorem 3.** The tasks of verifying the signature  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  and authenticating the public key  $y_a$  can be simultaneously achieved with Eq. (14).

**Proof:** From the right-hand side of Eq. (14), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&h(m, h(K), C') \\
&= h(m, h(K), K^{x_b} \pmod p) && \text{(by Eq. (12))} \\
&= h(m, h(g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)})_{h(ID_a)y_a})^{sr_2} \pmod p), \\
&\quad (g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)})_{h(ID_a)y_a})^{sr_2} \pmod p)^{x_b} \pmod p && \text{(by Eq. (11.a))} \\
&= h(m, h(g^{s(1+x_a r_2)} \pmod p), g^{s(1+x_a r_2)x_b} \pmod p) \\
&= h(m, h(g^k \pmod p), g^{kx_b} \pmod p) && \text{(by Eq. (10.a))} \\
&= h(m, h(g^k \pmod p), (\beta^{h(y_b, ID_b)})_{h(ID_b)y_b})^k \pmod p && \text{(by Eq. (6))} \\
&= h(m, h(g^k \pmod p), C) && \text{(by Eq. (7))} \\
&= r_2 \pmod q && \text{(by Eq. (9))}
\end{aligned}$$

which equals to the left-hand side of Eq. (14).

Q.E.D.

**The signature conversion stage:** When a later dispute of signer's repudiation occurs, the recipient  $U_b$  can show the dishonesty of the signer by releasing the converted signature  $(r_2, s, C')$  along with the recovered message  $m$ . Anyone can first compute  $K$  from Eq. (11.\*) and then validate the signature with Eq. (14). If the checking of Eq. (14) holds, he assures that the signature is generated by  $U_a$ .

**The recipient proof stage:** For convincing someone, say,  $U_c$ , that he is the real recipient, the recipient  $U_b$  can perform the following interactive steps with  $U_c$ :

- Step 1**  $U_b$  sends  $(r_2, s, C')$  and  $m$  to  $U_c$ .
- Step 2**  $U_c$  first computes  $K$  with the corresponding Eq. (11.\*) and then checks the signature's validity with Eq. (14). If it holds,  $U_c$  proceeds to the next step; otherwise, the protocol is terminated.
- Step 3**  $U_c$  randomly chooses an integer  $e$  to compute  $E = K^e \pmod p$  and then transmits  $E$  to  $U_b$ .
- Step 4** Upon receiving  $E$ ,  $U_b$  computes  $W = E^{x_b} \pmod p$  and returns it to  $U_c$ .
- Step 5**  $U_c$  computes  $W' = C'^e \pmod p$  and checks whether  $W = W'$ . If it holds,  $U_c$  is convinced that  $U_b$  is the designated recipient.



### 3. Self-Certified CAE Schemes Based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms

In this section, we present elliptic curve variants of proposed schemes based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [8, 13, 14]. The stages and the participating parties of the proposed elliptic curve variants are the same as those in the proposed schemes in Section 2. Initially, the SA determines the following parameters:

- $p$ : a large prime;
- $a, b$ : two parameters in  $Z_p$  satisfying that  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \pmod p \neq 0$ ;
- $E_p(a, b)$ : an elliptic curve over  $GF(p)$  containing a set of points  $(x, y)$  satisfying that  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod p$ ;
- $O$ : a point at infinity over  $E_p(a, b)$ ;
- $G$ : the base point of order  $q$  over  $E_p(a, b)$ , where  $q$  is a large prime;
- $h(\cdot)$ : a secure one-way hash function which accepts input of various length and generates output of a fixed length; note that the input of a point over  $E_p(a, b)$  represents the input of the concatenation of the  $x$ - and  $y$ - coordinates of that point;
- $\gamma$ : the SA's private key for  $\gamma \in Z_q^*$ ;
- $B$ : the SA's public key computed as  $B = \gamma G$  over  $E_p(a, b)$ . (15)

All of the above parameters are made public except for the SA's private key  $\gamma$ . In the following, all elliptic curve point operations are manipulated over  $E_p(a, b)$ . Details of each stage are shown as follows:

**The user registration stage:** To become a legitimate user,  $U_i$  associated with the identifier  $ID_i$  performs the registration process with the SA.

**Step 1**  $U_i$  first chooses an integer  $t_i \in Z_q^*$  to compute

$$V_i = h(t_i, ID_i)G, \tag{16}$$

and then sends  $(V_i, ID_i)$  to the SA.

**Step 2** After receiving  $(V_i, ID_i)$ , the SA chooses  $z_i \in Z_q^*$  to compute

$$Y_i = (h(ID_i)^{-1} \pmod q)(V_i + z_i G), \tag{17}$$

$$w_i = z_i + h(Y_i, ID_i)\gamma \pmod q, \tag{18}$$

and returns  $(Y_i, w_i)$  to  $U_i$ .

**Step 3**  $U_i$  computes  $x_i$  as

$$x_i = w_i + h(t_i, ID_i) \pmod q, \tag{19}$$

and checks its validity with the following equality.

$$h(Y_i, ID_i)B + h(ID_i)Y_i \stackrel{?}{=} x_i G. \tag{20}$$

If the above equation holds,  $U_i$  accepts  $(x_i, Y_i)$  as his private and public keys. Theorem 4 proves the correctness of Eq. (20) which also validates the authenticity of  $Y_i$  with respect to  $x_i$ .

**Theorem 4.**  $U_i$  can perform Eq. (20) to authenticate the public key  $Y_i$  with respect to his private key  $x_i$ .

**Proof:** From the left-hand side of Eq. (20), we have

$$\begin{aligned} h(Y_i, ID_i)B + h(ID_i)Y_i &= h(Y_i, ID_i)B + (V_i + z_i G) && \text{(by Eq. (17))} \\ &= (h(Y_i, ID_i)\gamma + z_i)G + V_i && \text{(by Eq. (15))} \\ &= w_i G + V_i && \text{(by Eq. (18))} \\ &= (w_i + h(t_i, ID_i))G && \text{(by Eq. (16))} \\ &= x_i G && \text{(by Eq. (19))} \end{aligned}$$

which equals to the right-hand side of Eq. (20).

Q.E.D.

**The signature generation and verification stage:** When  $U_a$  wants to send  $U_b$  the signature of a confidential message  $m$  with embedded redundancy.  $U_a$  first chooses an integer  $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes  $(C, r_1, r_2, s)$  as Eqs. (21), (8), (12) and (10.\*) of **Table 1**, respectively.

$$C = k(h(Y_b, ID_b)B + h(ID_b)Y_b) \tag{21}$$

$$r_2 = h(m, h(kG), C) \bmod q \tag{22}$$

$(r_1, r_2, s)$  is the signature for  $m$ , which is then sent to the designated recipient  $U_b$ . Upon receiving the signature,  $U_b$  first computers the corresponding  $K$  from Eq. (23.\*) of **Table 3** and  $C'$  from Eq. (24).

$$C' = x_b K \tag{24}$$

The message  $m$  with the embedded redundancy can be recovered from Eq. (13). After that,  $U_b$  can verify the signature  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  by testing Eq. (14). If it holds, the signature is valid; meanwhile, the signer's public key  $y_a$  is simultaneously authenticated.

Taking scheme I (with  $s$  and  $K$  separately computed as Eqs. (10.a) and Eq. (23.a)) as an example, we demonstrate that the proposed elliptic variants work correctly as the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6, respectively. Interested readers can follow the similar way to check the correctness of the other schemes.

**Theorem 5.** The recipient  $U_b$  can recover the message  $m$  with Eq. (13).

**Proof:** From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & h(C')\eta \\
 = & h(x_b K)\eta && \text{(by Eq. (24))} \\
 = & h(sx_b(r_2(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + G))\eta && \text{(by Eq. (23.a))} \\
 = & h((sx_b)(r_2x_aG + G))\eta && \text{(by Eq. (20))} \\
 = & h(sx_ar_2x_bG + sx_bG)\eta \\
 = & h((sx_ar_2 + s)(x_bG))\eta \\
 = & h((sx_ar_2 + s)(h(Y_b, ID_b)B + h(ID_b)Y_b))\eta && \text{(by Eq. (20))} \\
 = & h(k(h(Y_b, ID_b)B + h(ID_b)Y_b))\eta && \text{(by Eq. (10.a))} \\
 = & h(C)\eta && \text{(by Eq. (21))} \\
 = & m \pmod{p} && \text{(by Eq. (8))}
 \end{aligned}$$

which equals to the left-hand side of Eq. (13).

Q.E.D.

**Table 3.** Equations to compute  $K$  based on the ECDLP

I	$K = s(r_2(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + G)$	(23.a)
II	$K = r_2^{-1}(s(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + G)$	(23.b)
III	$K = r_2(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + sG$	(23.c)
IV	$K = s^{-1}(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a + r_2G)$	(23.d)
V	$K = r_2^{-1}(-(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + sG)$	(23.e)
VI	$K = s(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a) + r_2G$	(23.f)

**Theorem 6.** A valid signature  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  should satisfy Eq. (14) which also authenticates the public key  $Y_a$ .

**Proof:** From the right-hand side of Eq. (14), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & h(m, h(K), C') \\
 = & h(m, h(K), x_b K) && \text{(by Eq. (24))} \\
 = & h(m, h(sG + sr_2(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a)), \\
 & \quad x_b(sG + sr_2(h(Y_a, ID_a)B + h(ID_a)Y_a))) && \text{(by Eq. (23.a))} \\
 = & h(m, h((sr_2)x_aG + sG), x_b((sr_2)x_aG + sG)) && \text{(by Eq. (20))} \\
 = & h(m, h((sx_ar_2 + s)G), x_b(sx_ar_2 + s)G) \\
 = & h(m, h(kG), x_b kG) && \text{(by Eq. (10.a))} \\
 = & h(m, h(kG), k(h(Y_b, ID_b)B + h(ID_b)Y_b)) && \text{(by Eq. (20))} \\
 = & h(m, h(kG), C) && \text{(by Eq. (21))} \\
 = & r_2 \pmod{q} && \text{(by Eq. (22))}
 \end{aligned}$$

which equals to the left-hand side of Eq. (14).

Q.E.D.

**The signature conversion stage:** To handle the case of a later dispute, the recipient  $U_b$  can simply reveal the recovered message  $m$  and the converted signature  $(r_2, s, C')$ . Anyone can first compute  $K$  from Eq. (23.\*) and then validate the signature with Eq. (14). If the checking of Eq. (14) holds, he assures that the signature is generated by  $U_a$ .

**The recipient proof stage:** For convincing someone, say,  $U_c$ , that he is the real recipient, the recipient  $U_b$  can perform the following interactive steps with  $U_c$ :

- Step 1**  $U_b$  sends  $(r_2, s, C')$  to  $U_c$ .  
**Step 2**  $U_c$  first computes  $K$  with corresponding Eq. (23.\*) and then checks the signature's validity with Eq. (14). If it holds,  $U_c$  proceeds to the next step; otherwise, the protocol is terminated.  
**Step 3**  $U_c$  randomly chooses an integer  $e$  to compute  $E = eK$  and then transmits  $E$  to  $U_b$ .  
**Step 4** Upon receiving  $E$ ,  $U_b$  computes  $W = x_b E$  and returns it to  $U_c$ .  
**Step 5**  $U_c$  computes  $W' = eC'$  and checks whether  $W = W'$ . If it holds,  $U_c$  is convinced that  $U_b$  is the designated recipient.

## 4. Security Considerations and Performance Evaluation

In this section, we first defined some security notions for self-certified CAE schemes and then gave security proofs and the performance evaluation of our proposed schemes.

### 4.1 Security Notions

To facilitate the following proofs, we regenerate algorithms of User-registration, Signature-encryption-and-verification, Signature-conversion and Recipient-proof from each phase of the proposed schemes. The security notions of message confidentiality and unforgeability with respect to self-certified CAE schemes are defined below.

**Message Confidentiality.** A self-certified CAE scheme can fulfill the security requirement of message confidentiality if authenticated ciphertexts are indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attacks. We define a security model for indistinguishability of authenticated ciphertexts under chosen ciphertext attacks. In this model, the adversary attempts to decrypt a target ciphertext of the designated recipient.

**Definition 1.** A self-certified CAE scheme is said to be semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if there exists no polynomial-time adversary with a non-negligible advantage in the following game:

**Setup:** A challenger  $C$  first generates necessary system parameters and then obtains the signer  $U_a$ 's key pair  $(x_a, y_a)$  by the User-registration algorithm. System parameters and the signer  $U_a$ 's public key are given to an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Upon receiving these parameters, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  determines one designated recipient  $U_b^*$ . The recipient  $U_b^*$ 's public key  $y_b^*$  can be acquired from the User-registration algorithm, but the corresponding private key  $x_b^*$  is unknown to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Phase 1:** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can issue several kinds of queries adaptively:

- Signature-encryption-and-verification queries: The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can query either

Signature-encryption or Signature-verification. In the Signature-encryption queries, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces a message  $m$  with respect to  $U_a$  and sends it to the challenger  $C$  which then returns the result of Signature-encryption  $(m, x_a, y_b^*)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . In the Signature-verification queries, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$  and requests the result of Signature-verification  $(\sigma, y_a, x_b^*)$  with respect to  $U_a$  and  $U_b^*$  from the challenger  $C$ . If the recovered message is consistent with the redundancy check and its corresponding signature is valid,  $C$  responses the message; Otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as a result.

- Signature-conversion queries: The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$  and requests the result of Signature-conversion  $(\sigma, y_a, x_b^*)$  with respect to  $U_a$  and  $U_b^*$  from the challenger  $C$ . If the result  $(r_2, s, C')$  is a valid converted signature for the message  $m$  with suitable redundancy,  $C$  responses the result; Otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as a result.
- Recipient-proof queries: The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$  and requests the result of Recipient-proof  $(\sigma, y_a, x_b^*)$  with respect to  $U_a$  from the challenger  $C$ . If  $U_b^*$  is the designated recipient,  $C$  responses the symbol 1; Otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as a result.

**Challenge:** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces two messages,  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , of the same length. The challenger  $C$  flips a coin  $\lambda \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  and generates an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^* = \text{Signature-encryption}(m_\lambda, x_a, y_b^*)$  which is then delivered to  $\mathcal{A}$  as a target challenge.

**Phase 2:** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can issue new queries as those in Phase 1, except that the Signature-verification or Signature-conversion query for the target challenge  $\sigma^*$  is prohibited.

**Guess:** At the end of the game,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit  $\lambda'$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins this game if  $\lambda' = \lambda$ . We define  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage as  $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\lambda' = \lambda] - 1/2$ .

**Unforgeability.** A cryptographic scheme satisfies the security requirement of unforgeability if it is secure against chosen message attacks. We define a model for unforgeability of self-certified CAE scheme against chosen message attacks. In this model, the adversary attempts to forge a valid signature of one target message.

**Definition 2.** A self-certified CAE scheme is said to achieve existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks if there exists no polynomial-time adversary with a non-negligible advantage in the following game:

**Setup:** A challenger  $C$  first generates necessary system parameters, and then obtains the signer  $U_a$ 's key pair  $(x_a, y_a)$  and a designated recipient  $U_b$ 's key pair  $(x_b, y_b)$  by the User-registration algorithm. The challenger  $C$  then gives the forger  $\mathcal{F}$  system parameters, the signer  $U_a$ 's public key  $y_a$  and the designated recipient's public key  $y_b$ .

**Attack:** The forger  $\mathcal{F}$  issues the same queries as those in Phase 1 of Definition 1.

**Forgery:** Finally,  $\mathcal{F}$  produces an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^*$ . The forger  $\mathcal{F}$  wins if  $\sigma^*$  can be converted into a valid signature  $(r_2^*, s^*, C^*)$  for some message  $m^*$  with redundancy by the designated recipient. Note that it is not allowed to issue a Signature-encryption query for  $m^*$ .

## 4.2 Security Proof

The security of the proposed schemes is based on the DLP [4, 5] / ECDLP [25, 30, 31] and security of Nyberg-Rueppel signature schemes [32, 33]. For the details of Nyberg-Rueppel

signature schemes, we recommend the interested readers to refer to [32, 33]. Instead of separate discussions, we only take the DLP-based scheme I as an instance for the following proofs. Other schemes can be proved with similar ways. The definition of DLP is briefly restated below: Let  $p$  be a large prime,  $g$  a generator, and  $\alpha$  a random integer. It is computationally infeasible to derive  $\alpha$  from known  $(g, g^\alpha \bmod p)$ . In the following, we proved that the proposed schemes satisfy the security requirements of confidentiality and unforgeability as Theorems 7 and 8, respectively.

**Theorem 7.** *The proposed self-certified CAE scheme is  $(t, \varepsilon)$ -secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if there exists no polynomial-time algorithm  $\beta_1$  that can  $(t_1, \varepsilon_1)$ -break the DLP.*

**Proof.** Suppose that  $\mathcal{A}$  is a  $(t, \varepsilon)$ -algorithm that breaks the self-certified CAE scheme under the chosen ciphertext attack, where  $t$  denotes the running time and  $\varepsilon$  the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds. We will show that we can use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct a  $(t_1, \varepsilon_1)$ -algorithm  $\beta_1$  that solves the DLP in time  $t_1$  with the probability  $\varepsilon_1$ . The algorithm  $\beta_1$  is said to  $(t_1, \varepsilon_1)$ -break the DLP. Let  $(g, g^\alpha \bmod p)$  be a random instance of the DLP. The objective of the algorithm  $\beta_1$  is to derive  $\alpha$ . In this proof,  $\beta_1$  simulates challenger  $C$  in the game of Definition 1. In the meantime,  $\mathcal{A}$  adaptively issues queries as those defined in the game of Definition 1.

–Signature-encryption queries: When  $\mathcal{A}$  issues a Signature-encryption query on a message  $m$ , the algorithm  $\beta_1$  first randomly chooses an integer  $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes  $C = (\beta^{h(y_b^*, ID_b)}_{h(ID_b)y_b^*})^k \bmod p$ . Then,  $\beta_1$  computes  $r_1 = mh(C)^{-1} \bmod p$ ,  $r_2 = h(m, h(g^k \bmod p), C) \bmod q$ , and  $s = k(1 + x_a r_2)^{-1} \bmod q$ . Here,  $(r_1, r_2, s)$  is the authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma$  which is returned as the result of the Signature-encryption on the message  $m$ .

–Signature-verification queries: When  $\mathcal{A}$  issues a Signature-verification query on an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$ ,  $\beta_1$  first computes  $K = g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)}_{h(ID_a)y_a})^{sr_2} \bmod p$  and  $C' = K^{x_b^*} \bmod p$ . Then,  $\beta_1$  recovers  $m = h(C')r_1 \bmod p$ . If the recovered  $m$  is consistent with the redundancy check and the equality of  $r_2 = h(m, h(K), C') \bmod q$  holds,  $\beta_1$  outputs  $m$ ; otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as a result.

–Signature-conversion queries: When  $\mathcal{A}$  issues a Signature-conversion query on an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$ , the algorithm  $\beta_1$  first computes  $K = g^s (\beta^{h(y_a, ID_a)}_{h(ID_a)y_a})^{sr_2} \bmod p$  and  $C' = K^{x_b^*} \bmod p$ . Then,  $\beta_1$  recovers  $m = h(C')r_1 \bmod p$ . If the result  $(r_2, s, C')$  satisfies  $r_2 = h(m, h(K), C') \bmod q$ , outputs the result; Otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as result.

–Recipient-proof queries: When  $\mathcal{A}$  issues a Recipient-proof query on an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma = (r_1, r_2, s)$ ,  $\beta_1$  first performs the same steps as those in Signature-conversion queries, and then chooses an integer  $e$  to compute  $E = K^e \bmod p$ ,  $W = E^{x_b^*} \bmod p$ , and  $W' = C'^e \bmod p$ . If  $W = W'$ ,  $\beta_1$  outputs the symbol 1 as the result. Otherwise, the  $\perp$  symbol is returned as result.

**Challenge:** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  generates two messages,  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , of the same length. The challenger  $\beta_1$  flips a coin  $\lambda \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  and computes an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^* = \text{Signature-encryption}(m_\lambda, x_a, y_b^*)$ . The algorithm  $\beta_1$  first randomly chooses an integer  $Z$

$\in Z_q^*$  and computes  $C^* = (\beta^{h(y_b^*, ID_b)} h(ID_b) y_b^*)^Z \bmod p$ . Then,  $\beta_1$  computes  $r_1^* = m_\lambda h(C)^{-1} \bmod p$ ,  $r_2^* = h(m_\lambda, h(g^\alpha \bmod p), C) \bmod q$ , and  $s^* = Z(1 + x_a r_2)^{-1} \bmod q$ . The authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^* = (r_1^*, r_2^*, s^*)$  is sent to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the target challenge. If  $Z = \alpha$ , then  $\sigma^*$  is indeed a random Signature-encryption of  $m_\lambda$ . If  $Z$  is a random integer and does not equal to  $\alpha$ , then  $r_1^*$  and  $s^*$  are random elements. Therefore,  $\sigma^*$  is independent of  $\lambda$ .

**Phase 2:** The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  issues new queries as those in Phase 1. It is not allowed to make a Signature-verification or Signature-conversion query for the target challenge  $\sigma^*$ .

**Analysis:** Consider the case when  $Z = \alpha$ , the distribution of the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ 's view in the simulation is identical to that  $\mathcal{A}$  is playing the game with  $C$ . Consequently,  $\Pr_{\beta_1}[\text{Succ}] = \Pr_{\mathcal{A}}[\text{Succ}] - 1/2$ , where  $\Pr_{\mathcal{A}}[\text{Succ}]$  stands for the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds. When  $Z$  is uniformly distributed in  $Z_q^*$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has no information about the value of  $\lambda$  and hence the probability of  $\lambda' = \lambda$  is at most  $1/2$ . Therefore, we conclude that  $\Pr_{\beta_1}[\text{Succ}] = \varepsilon_1 \geq \Pr_{\mathcal{A}}[\text{Succ}] - 1/2 = \varepsilon - 1/2$ .

Q.E.D.

**Theorem 8.** *The proposed self-certified CAE scheme is  $(t, \varepsilon)$ -secure against existential forgery under chosen plaintext attacks if there exists no polynomial-time algorithm  $\beta_2$  that can forge the Nyberg-Rueppel signature in time  $t_2$  with the probability  $\varepsilon_2$ .*

**Proof.** Suppose that  $\mathcal{F}$  is a  $(t, \varepsilon)$ -algorithm that breaks the self-certified CAE scheme under chosen message attacks in time  $t$  with the probability  $\varepsilon$ . In fact, the signature verification (/message recovery) part of the proposed scheme is based on and expanded from the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme. We will construct a  $(t_2, \varepsilon_2)$ -algorithm  $\beta_2$  that forges the Nyberg-Rueppel signature in time  $t_2$  with the probability  $\varepsilon_2$  from the algorithm  $\mathcal{F}$ . The objective of the algorithm  $\beta_2$  is to derive a valid Nyberg-Rueppel signature. In this proof,  $\beta_2$  simulates  $\mathcal{F}$ 's challenger in the game of Definition 2 with the target signer  $U_a$ 's public key  $y_a^*$  where  $\beta^{h(y_a^*, ID_a)} h(ID_a) y_a^* = g^{x_a^*} \bmod p$ . Then,  $\mathcal{F}$  adaptively issues the same queries as those defined in the game of Definition 1.

**Forgery:** The algorithm  $\mathcal{F}$  generates an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^* = (r_1^*, r_2^*, s^*)$  for one target message  $m^*$  under the private key of the designated recipient. Note that  $\sigma^*$  is not obtained from a Signature-encryption query  $(m^*, x_a^*, y_b)$ .

**Analysis:**  $\mathcal{F}$  outputs an authenticated ciphertext  $\sigma^*$  which can be converted to the message  $m^*$  and its corresponding signature  $(r_2^*, s^*, C'^*)$  with a non-negligible probability. If  $(r_2^*, s^*, C'^*)$  satisfies the signature verification equation  $r_2^* = h(m^*, h(K^*), C'^*) \bmod q$  with the probability  $\varepsilon$ , then  $(r_2^*, s^*, C'^*)$  can be regarded as a valid Nyberg-Rueppel signature of the message  $m^*$  with respect to the public key  $y_a^*$ . It can be seen that  $\Pr_{\beta_2}[\text{Succ}]$  is hence at least  $\Pr_{\mathcal{F}}[\text{Succ}]$ . We conclude that  $\Pr_{\beta_2}[\text{Succ}] = \varepsilon_2 \geq \varepsilon$ .

Q.E.D.

### 4.3 AVISPA

We show through the simulation for the formal security verification using the widely accepted AVISPA (automated validation of internet security protocols and applications) tool [34] that our schemes are secure against malicious attacks. This is a push button tool for the automated validation of security protocols. There is a modular and expressive formal language called HLPSL (high level protocols specification language) which is used by AVISPA to specify the security protocol and their properties. It is a role-based language; therefore, we must first determine the sequence of actions of each kind of protocol participants in a module. This specification can later be instantiated by one or more agents playing the given role, and we further specify how the resulting participants interact with one another by combining multiple basic roles together into a composed role. HLPSL specification is translated into the Intermediate Format (IF), using `hlpsl2if`. IF specification is then processed by model-checkers

```
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
  SAFE
DETAILS
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
  /home/avispa/web-interface-computation/. /tempdir/workfile03FD9u.if
GOAL
  as_specified
BACKEND
  OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
  parseTime: 0.00s
  searchTime: 0.06s
  visitedNodes: 8 nodes
  depth: 3 plies
```

**Fig. 2.** The result of the analysis using OFMC on our scheme

```
SUMMARY
  SAFE
DETAILS
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
  TYPED_MODEL
PROTOCOL
  /home/avispa/web-interface-computation/. /tempdir/workfilealvjGr.if
GOAL
  As Specified
BACKEND
  CL-AtSe
STATISTICS
  Analysed : 0 states
  Reachable : 0 states
  Translation: 0.01 seconds
  Computation: 0.00 seconds
```

**Fig. 3.** The result of the analysis using ATSE on our scheme

to analyze if the security goals are violated. There are four different verification back end tools use to analyze the IF specification namely, OFMC (On-the-Fly Model-Checker), CL-AtSe (Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher), SATMC (SAT-based Model Checker), TA4SP (Tree Automata based Protocol Analyser). We refer to the samples of [35] for a detailed description of HLPSL. Fig. 2 and 3 are outputs of running OFMC and ATSE tools [36] on our proposed scheme I based on discrete logarithms.

### 4.4 Performance Evaluation

In this subsection, we compared the performance among previously proposed schemes [15, 17] and our DLP ones stated in Section 2. For assuring the validity of recipient's public key, the Wu-Hsu scheme [15] has to perform extra public key verification before any cryptographic mechanisms. On the contrary, since Lv *et al.*'s scheme [17] and our proposed ones adapt the properties of self-certified public key systems, the tasks of verifying the signature and authenticating the public key can be achieved simultaneously, which benefits



the transmission and computation performance. Since the modular exponentiation computation is the most time-consuming operation, we ignore others such as the one-way hash, multiplication, inverse and addition operation. As the detailed comparisons shown in **Table 4**, it can be seen that the proposed schemes not only preserve the merit that the signature conversion process requires neither computation efforts nor communication overheads, but also outperform the Wu-Hsu scheme and Lv *et al.*'s scheme in terms of the computation efficiency for the entire protocol. Note that the Wu-Hsu scheme [15] has to perform extra public key verification and does not provide the property of recipient proof. Seeing that Lv *et al.*'s scheme will incur rather high computation complexity, we proposed six efficient variants based on the ElGamal signature scheme. Specifically, we optimize the signer's computational cost in variants II, IV and V, i.e.,  $3T_e$ . Moreover, the last column in **Table 4** shows that the proposed schemes are more efficient than the others.

## 5. Conclusions

In some applications, the signature only needs to be verified by some specified recipients while keeping the message secret from the public. The authenticated encryption schemes can be used to achieve this purpose. In the normal procedure, only the recipient can recover the message and verify the signature. In case that the signer repudiates his signing, the recipient can release an ordinary signature for public verification. In this paper, we have proposed

**Table 4.** Comparisons among previously proposed schemes and our DLP ones.

Scheme	Signature generation	Message recovery and signature verification	Converted signature verification	Recipient proof	Total cost
WH [15]	$5T_e$	$6T_e$	$5T_e$	N.A.	$16T_e$
LWK [17]	$5T_e$	$6T_e$	$3T_e$	$7T_e$	$21T_e$
I	$3T_e$	$4T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$16T_e$
II	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$15T_e$
III	$3T_e$	$4T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$16T_e$
IV	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$15T_e$
V	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$15T_e$
VI	$3T_e$	$4T_e$	$3T_e$	$6T_e$	$16T_e$

- Remarks:
1. Let  $T_e$  be the time for performing a modular exponentiation computation.
  2. WH and LWK separately represent the Wu-Hsu and Lv *et al.*'s schemes. I to VI denote the proposed schemes I to VI, respectively.
  3. Suppose that verifying the public key certificate of the Wu-Hsu scheme is implemented with ElGamal signature verification [6], i.e.,  $T_m + 3T_e$ .

efficient and computationally indistinguishable self-certified CAE schemes based on discrete logarithms along with their elliptic curve variants. Implemented with self-certified public key systems, our proposed schemes require no extra certificate since the tasks of verifying the signature and authenticating the public key can be simultaneously carried out in one step.

In case of a later dispute, the recipient has the ability to solely convert the signature into an ordinary one without any computation efforts or communication overheads. In addition, the recipient is capable of convincing anyone that he is the real recipient. The proposed schemes are shown to be efficient and secure against known existential active attacks. Furthermore, compared with existing CAE schemes [15, 17], our scheme greatly reduces the computational costs. They also satisfy the semantic security requirement. Moreover, the elliptic curve variants with shorter key length can help with faster execution and more bandwidth savings, so as to provide crucial benefits in the applications of limited computing power and insufficient storage space like mobile phones, etc.

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## Appendix

```
role alice ( A,B : agent,
            Kab : symmetric_key,
            H   : hash_func,
            SND, RCV : channel(dy) )
played_by A
def=
```

```
G       : text,
M       : message,
Ya, Yb  : public_key,
MUL     : hash_func
const alice_bob_na, bob_alice_nb : protocol_id
init State := 0
```

```

local State : nat,
    R1,R2 : text,
    K,C : text,
    S : text,
exp(MUL(exp(H(Ya.Yb),H(Yb.B)).H(B).Yb),K')
    ^ R1' := MUL(M.H(C'))
    ^ R2' := H(M.H(exp(G, K').C'))
    ^ S' := MUL(K'.inv(Ya).R2')
    ^ SND({R1'.R2'.S'}_Kab)
    ^ witness(A,B,bob_alice_nb,R2')
end role

```

```

role bob ( A,B : agent,
    Kab : symmetric_key,
    H : hash_func,
    SND, RCV : channel(dy))
played_by B
def=

```

```

local State : nat,
    R1,R2, S : text,
    K,C : text,
    G : text,
    M : message,
    Ya, Yb : public_key,
    MUL : hash_func
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 ^ RCV({R1'.R2'.S'}_Kab) =>
    State' := 3 ^ K' :=
MUL(exp(G,S').exp(MUL(exp(H(Ya.Yb),H(Ya.A)).H
(A).Ya),MUL(S'.R2'))))
    ^ C' := exp(K',inv(Yb))
    ^ M' := MUL(H(C').R1')
    ^ R2' := H(M'.H(K').C')
    ^ witness(B, A, alice_bob_na, R2')
    ^ request(B, A, bob_alice_nb, R2')
end role

```

```

transition
1. State = 0 ^ RCV(start) =>
    State' := 2 ^ K' := new()
    ^ C' :=
role session(A, B : agent,
    Kab : symmetric_key,
    Hash : hash_func)
def=
local SA, RA,
    SB, RB : channel(dy)
composition
    alice (A, B, Kab, Hash, SA, RA)
    ^ bob (A, B, Kab, Hash, SB, RB)
end role

```

```

role environment()
def=
const a, b : agent,
    kab, kai, kib : symmetric_key,
    h : hash_func,
    bob_alice_nb, k : protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {a, b, h, kai, kib}

```

```

composition
    session(a, b, kab, h)
    ^ session(a, i, kai, h)
    ^ session(i, b, kib, h)
end role

```

```

goal
    secrecy_of k
    authentication_on bob_alice_nb
end goal

```

```

environment()

```